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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Poverty of Criminology 
Criminology is an academic discipline with the goal of 
explaining and understanding crime and criminal behavior. If 
we are to successfully address the problem of crime in the 
United States, the explanations and understandings derived 
from criminological investigations should inform criminal 
justice policy and systems operation. Criminology today is 
an interdisciplinary field drawing its explanations and 
understandings from such disciplines as sociology (e.g., 
Hagan, 1994; Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994; Gottfredson and 
Hirschi, 1990; Currie, 1985a), psychology (e.g., Eysenck, 1989 
and 1977; Yochelson and Samenow, 1977 and 1976; Bandura, 
1973), economics (e.g., Becker, 1976 and 1968; Becker and 
Landes, 1974; Ehrlich, 1974), and biology (e.g., Jeffery, 1989 
and 1979; Gordon, 1986; Mednick, Moffitt, and Stack, 1987; 
Mednick and Christiansen, 1977; Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985). 
Interdisciplinary approaches to criminology have largely been 
pursued because it is believed that they can increase our 
ability to explain and understand crime and criminal behavior 
by drawing upon insights provided by various disciplines. 
However, it will be argued in this dissertation that a common 
problem in interdisciplinary approaches advocated today is 
that they actually severely limit our understanding of crime. 
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and if followed in terms of policy, will clearly limit our 
ability to address the problem of crime in the United States. 
These interdisciplinary approaches have lost key insights 
provided by a sociological and social-structural understanding 
of crime and criminality. Several prominent interdisciplinary 
approaches will be examined to see where they are taking us 
in terms of explanation, understanding, and criminal justice 
policy. 
It will be argued in this dissertation that the inter­
disciplinary theories to be examined fail to understand the 
complex phenomenon of crime because they lack adequate 
attention to the complexity of criminal behavior. Several 
researchers have noted in recent years a trend in criminology 
towards focusing upon individuals as the explanatory variables 
to understanding crime, while neglecting the role of the 
social context or social-structural factors in generating 
crime (e.g.. National Research Council, 1993; Phillips, 1991; 
Lilly, Cullen, and Ball, 1989; Currie, 1985a; Jensen, 1981). 
The interdisciplinary theories to be examined in this 
dissertation reflect such a shift in focus. The problems 
emanating from such an approach and the reasons for this shift 
in criminology will be explored as a critical analysis of 
these perspectives is undertaken. 
The critique contained in this dissertation will include 
a sociology of interdisciplinary criminology and a critique of 
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ideology. Like Gouldner, who sought a "...critical 
understanding of the social mission of Academic Sociology,..." 
one of the aims herein is to "... formulate some tentative 
ideas about the social mandate..." of several theories of 
crime claiming to be interdisciplinary, the ideologies they 
express, and their link to the larger society (1970:26). 
Through a critique of these examples of interdisciplinary 
criminology an attempt will be made to shed some light on the 
interests embedded in these theories and the reasons for their 
popularity. Not only have individualistic non-structural 
theories been attractive to some theorists, they have also 
been the preferred explanations of many politicians, criminal 
justice professionals, and the public in general (Scheingold, 
1991). The popularity of crime myths, explanations, and 
understandings that blame individuals and excuse the existing 
social order has been noted by several researchers (e.g., 
Kappeler, Blumberg, and Potter, 1993; National Research 
Council, 1993; Phillips, 1991; Lilly et al., 1989; Currie, 
1985a; Jensen, 1981). After developing a critique of this 
brand of interdisciplinary criminology and its policy 
implications, a "new criminology" will be advocated that 
embraces the complexity of crime and its origins in a social 
context. It will be argued that a non-reductionist, 
structural, and reflexive criminology can provide us with a 
more complete explanation and understanding of crime and 
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criminality, in addition to suggesting policy directions that 
get at the "roots" of crime. Before launching into a critique 
of several prominent examples of interdisciplinary theories of 
crime and recommendations for the future of criminology, the 
methods of analysis to be employed in this effort will be 
discussed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HETHODS OF ANALYSIS 
A Critique of Interdisciplinary Criminology 
This dissertation will consist of a critique of 
theoretical statements in criminology that claim to be 
interdisciplinary and improvements over other theories of 
crime, theories which have in fact lost, or ignored, a 
sociological and social-structural criminology. It will 
be argued that these theories are therefore not adequately 
"interdisciplinary." The theories will be evaluated along 
several criteria. The critique begins with a sociology of 
criminology which includes a discussion of the theories' level 
of analysis, followed by an examination of their domain 
assumptions. Through an analysis of domain assumptions the 
social and political interests embedded in these perspectives 
will be explored. The analysis in this dissertation also 
incorporates a critique of ideology. It will be argued that 
the ideology contained in these examples of interdisciplinary 
criminology reflect an alienated view of men and women in 
society. In addition, since the criminological perspective 
and assumptions one embraces suggests plans for action to 
address crime, the policy implications from these perspectives 
on crime will be examined. A more detailed description of the 
methods of analysis follows below. For the sake of 
simplicity, the examples of criminological theories to be 
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critiqued will heretofore be referred to as "interdis­
ciplinary" theories of crime. 
A Sociology of Interdisciplinary Criminology 
The Fallacy of Autonomy 
The critique of interdisciplinary criminology begins with 
a discussion of a common error in focus and level of analysis. 
Interdisciplinary theories commit what Currie (1985a) terms 
"the fallacy of autonomy." This fallacy amounts to attri­
buting the "causes" of crime to individuals or to institutions 
divorced from their larger social contexts and influences, 
such as the economy, the labor market, the community, or 
patterns of economic and racial inequality. When a theorist 
commits the fallacy of autonomy, they have failed to recognize 
that our lives take place within social contexts that are 
embedded with meaning, that life and its events, including 
crime, do not take place within a vacuum. By focusing on 
individuals or social institutions divorced from their larger 
social contexts and influences, interdisciplinary criminology 
overlooks key explanatory factors in crime causation. For 
example, when crime is attributed to a loss or lack of self-
control, without examining the sources of this deficit, an 
incomplete explanation and understanding of crime is the 
result. Social-structural factors that could contribute to 
low self-control are left unexamined. The theories of crime 
7 
critiqued in this study will be examined for this form of 
reductionism. 
Domain Assumptions 
To gain an understanding of the interests embedded in the 
interdisciplinary theories of crime being examined here, their 
domain assumptions regarding human nature, the nature of 
society, and the desirability and possibility of social change 
will be examined. Several assumptions guide the analysis 
contained herein. First, whether we "like it or not, and know 
it or not, sociologists...organize their researches in terms 
of their prior assumptions..." (Gouldner, 1970:28). This 
certainly holds true for criminologists as well as for other 
social scientists. Our claims to knowledge and our theories 
regarding the nature of social reality, including crime, are 
themselves socially situated social products, reflecting 
social, political, and individual interests and value 
positions (Pfohl, 1994; Gouldner, 1976 and 1970; Strasser, 
1976; Horton, 1974; Mannheim, 1936). As Brown notes, 
"... every representation is always a representation from some 
point of view, within some frame of vision" (1990:188). 
Therefore, in order to understand the character, perspective, 
or point of view of a particular theory of crime and the 
interests embedded, it is necessary to examine the theorist's 
"background" and "domain assumptions" regarding humanity and 
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society. According to Gouldner; 
Domain assumptions are the things attributed 
to all members of a domain; in part they are 
shaped by the thinker's world hypotheses and, 
in turn, they shape his deliberately wrought 
theories. They are an aspect of the larger 
culture that is most intimately related to the 
postulations of theory. They are also one of 
the important links between the theorist's 
work and the larger society (1970:31). 
Domain assumptions are theory shaping. Domain assumptions, or 
what Strasser (1976) calls "guiding interests of cognition," 
significantly influence what a sociologist, or criminologist, 
"...looks for, what he sees, and what he does with his 
observations by way of fitting them, along with other facts, 
into a larger scheme of explanation" (Inkeles, cited in 
Strasser, 1976:18). The theory or perspective that one 
embraces reflects one's domain assumptions or guiding 
interests and likewise shapes what one sees and what one does 
with one's observations. As Michalowski notes, "...it is 
through the prism of perspective that we view reality, and 
like prisms they color our understanding of the world around 
us" (1977:19). An examination of a theory and its domain 
assumptions can help reveal the social interests of the 
theorist(s) and expose what is taken for granted and left 
unexamined. But we also need to explore what is being 
examined. As Williams (1981) warns, if one only focuses on 
the values and assumptions hidden in a theory, without 
examining its content, our ability to move ahead in 
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criminology and develop a more complete explanation and 
understanding of crime will be hampered.^ 
Part of the discussion of socially situated value 
positions and interests embedded in theories also involves an 
examination of the social context in which theories emerge and 
prosper (e.g., Scheingold, 1991; Lilly et al., 1989; Bohm, 
1981; Williams, 1981; Gouldner, 1970). As Lilly and 
colleagues note, "...social context plays a critical role in 
nourishing certain ways of theorizing about crime" (1989:11). 
And since "...different theories suggest different ways to 
reduce crime" (Lilly et al., 1989:13), the social context 
helps to shape what will and will not be done about crime. 
Through exploring the social context in which theories on 
crime emerge, we can gain a better understanding of why a 
particular theory arises and gains popularity and why others 
lose or never hold favor. A complete sociology of 
criminology, then, includes a critical examination of the 
assumptions behind the theory, its guiding interests, its 
social context, and its content in terms of its explanation 
and understanding of crime. In critically examining 
interdisciplinary criminology, it is important to recognize 
that the model of society proposed by any theory in question 
induces a selective focus (Strasser, 1976:15-17). In the 
following pages, the selective focus of several interdis­
ciplinary theories of crime will be examined. 
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A Critique of Ideology 
As part of the critique and sociology of interdisci­
plinary criminology, the analysis in this dissertation 
incorporates a critique of ideology. Through an examination 
of the ideologies present in interdisciplinary criminology, 
the selective focuses of these perspectives will be made 
clearer. As Bernstein notes, "...ideologies are based upon 
beliefs and interpretations which purport to be true or valid. 
These beliefs and interpretations are consequently subject to 
rational criticism" (1976:108). The attempt here will be to 
critically understand the ideologies expressed and unexpressed 
in the interdisciplinary theories of crime being examined. 
According to Bernstein: 
the critique of ideology has several inter­
related functions: (1) It must describe and 
accurately characterize the ideology.... (2) 
It seeks a depth interpretation of the ideology 
which will at once reveal how the ideology re­
flects and distorts an underlying social and 
political reality. (3) It seeks to discover 
the material and psychological factors that 
reinforce and sustain it. (4) It seeks to 
isolate the fundamental beliefs and interpre­
tations that are the basis of the ideology. 
(5) It seeks to dissolve the legitimizing 
power of ideologies by overcoming resistance 
in the ideologies' defenders (1976:108). 
Through this process, the accuracy, interests, distortions, 
interpretations, and ideologies present in the interdisci­
plinary perspectives of crime under examination will be 
exposed for analysis. 
It is important to note that both theoretical statements 
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and empirical theories contain ideologies. While empirical 
theories may claim to report the "facts" about social 
phenomena, they are nonetheless ideological in their claims. 
According to Bernstein: 
one must stress that the explicit intention 
of those who advance such theories is to give 
an objective and value-neutral account of the 
'facts,' not to pass off their value judgements 
as factual descriptions. ...By virtue of the 
belief that they are simply doing good empiri­
cal science, social scientists give a false 
legitimacy to claims that they are not merely 
empirical and scientific. The critique of em­
pirical theory as ideology seeks to reveal 
these hidden and dubious value biases (1976; 
107) . 
A number of theorists stress the importance of critically 
examining the ideologies embedded in theories in order to 
better understand their character and interests (e.g., Lilly 
et al., 1989; Bohm, 1981; Williams, 1981; Gouldner, 1970 and 
1976). This is important because social theories, including 
theories of crime, carry with them implications for action in 
terms of prevention or remediation, and in terms of whether 
the focus for change will be the individual, their immediate 
surroundings, or the larger social-structure. As Lilly and 
colleagues note, "understanding why crime occurs...is a 
prelude to developing strategies to control the behavior" 
because different theoretical perspectives suggest different 
courses of action to reduce or eliminate crime (1989:12-13). 
Even when a theory suggests no change or action at all, 
interests are expressed in its implicit acceptance of the 
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status quo (Bohm, 1981; Geiger, 1947). Gouldner made this 
point clear when he stated that: 
...every social theory facilitates the pur­
suit of some but not all courses of action, 
and thus encourages us to change or to accept 
the world as it is, to say yea or nay to it. 
In a way, every theory is a discreet obituary 
or celebration for some social system (1970:47). 
In summary, through a critique of ideology we can better 
assess the interests embedded in a theory of crime, the 
reasons for the attractiveness of a particular theory, and its 
value in terms of an explanation and understanding of crime. 
We can also assess the implications of adhering to such 
approaches in terms of policy recommendations and "solutions" 
to crime. Before beginning the critique and analysis of 
interdisciplinary criminology, the selection criteria will be 
discussed for the inclusion interdisciplinary theories of 
crime in this dissertation. 
Selection Criteria for inclusion of 
Interdisciplinary Theories 
The theories that have been included for critique in this 
dissertation were selected because they are representative of 
a disturbing trend in criminology today. The trend, already 
introduced, involves a focus upon individuals as the level of 
analysis and a diminishing of the importance of social-
structural factors in explaining, understanding, and 
addressing crime. As already noted, this trend has been 
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recognized by a number of researchers (e.g., National Research 
Council, 1993; Phillips, 1991; Lilly et al., 1989; Currie, 
1985a; Jensen, 1981). Despite these limitations, the theories 
selected claim to be interdisciplinary (or integrated) in some 
fashion. Their claim of "interdisciplinarity" carries with it 
an assumption that these perspectives are in some way 
improvements over other theories of crime because they break 
the disciplinary barriers by including insights from various 
fields of study. However, it will be argued that these 
theories are not adequately interdisciplinary due to their 
lack of social-structural insights from sociology and other 
disciplines. 
In addition to the claim of interdisciplinarity, all the 
theories to be critiqued in this dissertation claim to be 
theories of all crime. But in reality, since these theories 
ignore the social structure's and social context's role in 
crime causation, it will be argued that the complexity of much 
of crime and criminal behavior is lost in their explanations 
and understandings. The understandings that are provided by 
the interdisciplinary theories being critiqued in this 
dissertation turn out to be variants of control theories of 
crime—theories that emphasize individual self-control and the 
importance of social controls and social bonds to significant 
others or institutions in preventing crime and criminality. As 
Messner and Rosenfeld note, "control theory...is arguably 
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the dominant theoretical perspective within criminology today" 
(1994:47). As evidence of this dominance, Messner and 
Rosenfeld discuss a survey of articles published between 1964 
and 1992 in Criminology, the journal of the American Society 
of Criminology, which found that articles on control theory 
far and away dominated the journal. The dominance, popu­
larity, and influence of control explanations of crime and 
delinquency has been noted by other theorists including Curran 
and Renzetti (1994), Williams and McShane (1994), Beirne and 
Messerschmidt (1991), and Farrington and colleagues (1986). 
In addition, Hirschi's (1969) version of control theory, the 
basis for Gottfredson and Hirschi's general theory of crime—a 
theory to be critiqued in this dissertation—has developed 
into one of the most dominant perspectives in criminology 
today (Gibbons, 1994). As will be discussed in greater detail 
later in this dissertation, control theories also lack social-
structural insights and analysis, in addition to other 
deficiencies, and therefore offer an incomplete explanation 
and understanding of crime. 
In summary, the theories included were chosen because 
they represent a disturbing trend in criminology today, 
including an individual focus, a lack of attention to the 
importance of social-structural or contextual factors in crime 
causation, claims to interdisciplinarity and therefore 
superiority, and they are examples of control theories of 
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crime—one of the dominant perspectives, if not the dominate 
perspective in criminology today. As a result of their 
particular brand of "interdisciplinarity" and their control 
theory focus (and the dominance of control theories in 
criminology), these theories offer inadequate explanations and 
understandings of crime and criminality. A brief introduction 
to the theories to be critiqued follows below. 
The first theory to be discussed is Gottfredson and 
Hirschi's "general theory of crime" (1990; Hirschi and 
Gottfredson, 1988). These theorists reject the interdis­
ciplinary label for their perspective in favor of the "general 
theory" designation. However, Gottfredson and Hirschi do 
claim to pursue a theory "...that can broaden the interests of 
criminology to encompass all of the disciplines contributing 
to it" (1988:24). Furthermore, they state that they have 
"...tried to write a book that is free of the constraints of 
disciplinary perspectives..." (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 
1990;xiv). In other words, they have chosen to pursue an 
interdisciplinary criminology. As with the other theories to 
be critiqued here, Gottfredson and Hirschi believe that their 
perspective is in many ways an improvement over other theories 
of crime and criminality. Their theory purports to be a 
theory of all crime, and it consists of a restatement and 
modification of Hirschi's (1969) earlier version of control 
theory (Gibbons, 1994; Williams and McShane, 1994; Hirschi and 
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Gottfredson, 1993; Polk, 1991). As mentioned above, control 
theories are perhaps the most dominant perspective in 
criminology today, Hirschi's (1969) formulation of control 
theory being preeminent (Gibbons, 1994; Williams and McShane, 
1994) . 
The second effort to be examined is an interdisciplinary 
theory advanced by Farrington, Ohlin and Wilson (1986). This 
theory, which is left unnamed, emerged from an interdisci­
plinary study group on crime funded by the MacArthur 
Foundation. After summarizing their view of what is known 
about crime from an interdisciplinary perspective, these 
researchers suggest strategies to learn more about crime while 
exploring policy issues in order to develop "cost-effective" 
strategies to prevent criiae. Like Gottfredson and Hirschi 
(1990), these researchers claim that their approach is an 
improvement over what has passed before. These authors also 
recognize and embrace the dominance of control theory 
explanations of delinquent (criminal) conduct (Farrington et 
al., 1986:96). In attempting to explain all crime, their 
theory emphasizes the importance of self- and social control 
in preventing crime. 
The third perspective to be critiqued is found in 
Wilson's Thinking About Crime (1983), and Wilson and 
Herrnstein's Crime and Human Nature (1985). With a "crime-
control policy" focus, the perspective advocated claims to be 
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interdisciplinary. While this perspective has been critiqued 
extensively by Scheingold (1991), Lilly and colleagues (1989), 
Kamin (1986), and Currie (1985a), among others, it is 
discussed here because it represents perhaps most clearly the 
trend in recent years towards focusing on the individual to 
the exclusion of the social-structure, and the claim to 
legitimacy and superiority because the theory is "inter­
disciplinary." Wilson and Herrnstein's theory was intended to 
explain all crime and like the other two theories analyzed, a 
primary focus is again upon the importance of self- and social 
control in addressing crime. Wilson and Herrnstein, however, 
also stress the importance of constitutional factors and 
predispositions in causing crime. 
The critique of interdisciplinary criminology will 
conclude with a sampling of various other perspectives 
claiming to be interdisciplinary that commit similar errors to 
those discussed above. In this fashion, the explanations, 
understandings, claims, limitations, and problems inherent in 
such approaches will be explored and evaluated. 
This dissertation does not argue for disciplinary 
criminology. The issues at stake here are far more important 
than protection of professional "turf." What is at stake is 
our understanding of and our ability to deal humanely and 
effectively with crime. A criminology that is interdis­
ciplinary should increase our understanding of crime by adding 
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insights from all relevant disciplines. But as will be 
demonstrated, the theories mentioned above are crippled in 
their understanding of crime because they ignore the insights 
of a sociological and structural criminology. Such a crippled 
criminology is bound to develop an incomplete explanation and 
understanding of crime in addition to recommending and 
developing inadequate policies for the prevention and/or 
remediation of crime. By claiming to be "interdisciplinary," 
there is an attempt to bestow a sense of legitimacy upon these 
reductionist approaches to explaining and understanding crime. 
The primary aim of this study is to expose this reductionism, 
challenge the legitimacy of these perspectives based on 
interdisciplinarity, and to offer a vision of a criminology 
that is sociological, structural, reflexive, and truly 
interdisciplinary. 
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CHAPTER 3 
A SOCIOLOGY OF INTERDISCIPLINARY CRIMINOLOGY 
Sociologist Gary Jensen notes that in discussions of 
delinquency by sociologists, "the search for causes of 
delinquency...has become less distinctively sociological.... 
The explanatory variables studied as well as the conception of 
the phenomena to be explained have been shifting toward 
properties of individuals" (1981:8-9). While Jensen was 
commenting specifically on sociological theories of 
delinquency, the same can be said of many theories of crime 
today including the interdisciplinary theories to be examined 
here. This shift in focus has also been noted in research by 
the National Research Council (1993), Phillips (1991), Lilly 
and colleagues (1989), and Currie (1985a). The problems 
inherent in such a focus will become evident as several 
examples of interdisciplinary theories are examined in the 
following pages. The critique begins with a discussion of 
their level of analysis. 
Interdisciplinary Theories and the 
Fallacy of Autonomy 
One of the major problems with many interdisciplinary 
theories in criminology today is that they locate the primary 
cause of crime in the individual while minimizing, and 
sometimes ignoring, the social-structural conditions that 
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could lead to crime. For example, according to Gottfredson 
and Hirschi (1990), the cause of all crime comes down to a 
lack of self-control. These authors state that criminal 
offenders appear to have little self-control over their 
desires, instead opting for the pleasures of the moment 
(Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990;xv). Furthermore, they state 
that "the major 'cause' of low self-control...appears to be 
ineffective child-rearing" (1990:97). Crime, according to 
Gottfredson and Hirschi, is caused by an individual's low 
self-control over their passions and desires, and their low 
self-control was probably the result of poor up-bringing. This 
is the crux of the their "general theory of crime" which is 
intended to explain all crime—"...crime is a unitary 
phenomenon capable of explanation by a single theory, a theory 
that seeks first the features common to all crimes and deduces 
from them tendencies to criminality in the individual" 
(1990:201). And in their "general theory" the focus is upon 
the individual with their immediate surroundings of the family 
and school playing a contributing role, but the larger social 
context is for all intents and purposes, ignored. Gottfredson 
and Hirschi: 
...offer...a view in which the state is 
neither the cause nor the solution to crime. 
In our view, the origins of criminality of 
low self-control are to be found in the first 
six or eight years of life, during which time 
the child remains under the control and super­
vision of the family or a familial institution 
(1990:272). 
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This is where Gottfredson and Hirschi commit a critical error 
common in the examples of interdisciplinary criminology being 
examined here. They commit what Currie terms "the fallacy of 
autonomy—the belief that what goes on inside the family can 
usefully be separated from the forces that affect it from the 
outside: the larger social context in which families are 
imbedded for better or for worse" (1985a:l85). Gottfredson 
and Hirschi continually minimize the effects of the social-
structure or context first by focusing on low self-control in 
the individual as the explanatory factor for all criminal 
behavior. They further minimize the importance of the social 
context by focusing on one aspect, the family, in isolation 
from other social-structural or contextual influences. The 
fact that such factors as economic inequality, unemployment, 
and/or patterns of discrimination impact the family, thus 
influencing the likelihood of crime and delinquency, is 
minimized, ignored, and sometimes denied by Gottfredson and 
Hirschi. For example, when discussing the importance of 
parental monitoring of children's behavior as an important 
element in teaching children self-control, Gottfredson and 
Hirschi mention that parents may not have the time or energy 
to monitor their children's behavior (1990:98). But that is 
all they say—they do not discuss the factors that effect a 
parent's ability and/or energy to monitor. And structural 
factors, such as a decline in real income and the increasing 
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need for both parents to work and earn a wage to make up for 
this loss, are factors that limit parent's ability to 
supervise or monitor their children (National Research 
Council, 1993). But instead of addressing such factors, 
Gottfredson and Hirschi emphasize the individual and their 
family while neglecting the importance of social-structural 
factors in influencing both. A discussion of research 
suggesting that social-structural factors play a significant 
role in generating crime (to be discussed later) is missing 
from their analysis. It appears that Gottfredson and Hirschi 
choose to ignore the social-structural evidence on crime that 
runs counter to their theory, a disturbing practice also noted 
by Polk (1991). Furthermore, as Currie (1985a) points out, 
there is a curious interest among some criminologists, like 
Gottfredson and Hirschi, with the "under the roof culture" 
while ignoring the larger culture and social conditions that 
shape and influence the "under the roof culture" in the first 
place. This tendency to emphasize the individual and the 
family, while minimizing or ignoring the social setting or 
context, has been common in the literature on delinquent and 
criminal behavior over the last two decades and it leads to 
some disturbing consequences. 
In a recent study by the National Research Council (NRC) 
entitled. Losing Generations; Adolescents in Hiah-Risk 
Settings (1993) , an interdisciplinary panel of researchers 
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concludes that there has been an overemphasis in recent years 
on individual approaches to delinquency and other adolescent 
problems. The conclusions of the panel, which are also 
applicable to the study of crime in general, are worth citing 
at length here. 
The work of this panel began as an attempt 
to better understand why some adolescents are 
drawn to risky life-styles while others, simi­
larly situated, engage^in only normal adoles­
cent experimentation. As our work progressed, 
however, we became convinced that a focus on 
individual characteristics of adolescents 
would contribute to the overemphasis of the 
last two decades on the personal attributes 
of adolescents and their families at the ex­
pense of attention to the effects of settings 
or context. We concluded that it was impor­
tant to right the balance by focusing on the 
profound influence that settings have on the 
behavior and development of adolescents (NRC, 
1993:1). 
Importantly, the NRC report recognizes the impact of social 
setting or context on the development of adolescents and in 
the development of delinquency and other high-risk behaviors. 
The social surroundings of the family, the school, the 
community, and the economy are recognized as having profound 
influence on the emergence of these problems. The findings of 
the NRC panel run counter to the analysis and suggestions made 
by Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), as well as the other 
interdisciplinary theories of crime to be discussed, and 
supports the need for the development of a criminology that 
includes social-structural factors as variables of key 
importance. Indeed, the panel recommends that primary 
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emphasis be placed on social setting and context, in other 
words, on social-structural factors in order to successfully 
understand and address the problem of delinquency (NRC), 
1993:12). According to the panel: 
Although individual programs have shown 
impressive results and have provided a life 
raft for some adolescents, they are not a 
substitute for fundamental improvements in 
the major settings that are the framework of 
adolescent life. 
The focus on settings reflects the panel's 
appreciation of the profound influence that 
context has on adolescent behavior and our 
judgement that the power of settings on ado­
lescent development has been underappreciated. 
The lack of attention to settings has resul­
ted in an incomplete picture of adolescence 
and an excessive concentration on individual 
adolescent behaviors and programs.... The 
categorical focus on individual behaviors has 
been largely ineffective because behavior is 
the result of individual and group interac­
tions with the environment. Primary, sustained 
attention must be paid to reducing the exposure 
of children and adolescents to high-risk set­
tings. .. (NRC) , 1993:11-12). 
Whereas the examples of interdisciplinary criminology to 
be examined in this dissertation commit the fallacy of 
autonomy, the NRC report, complied by an interdisciplinary 
panel of researchers, recognizes that individuals and families 
do not develop or live in a vacuum. Indeed, social-structural 
factors, factors related to setting or context in the language 
of the report, play key roles in shaping behavior and in 
"causing" delinquent or criminal behavior. This recognition 
is rare in interdisciplinary criminology today. In support of 
a structural and interdisciplinary criminology, the NRC report 
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concludes that; 
Family income is perhaps the single most im­
portant factor in determining the settings 
in which children and adolescents spend their 
lives. Housing, neighborhoods, schools, and 
the social opportunities that are linked to 
them are largely controlled by income.... 
(And) ...income is a powerful influence in 
shaping that most important of settings, the 
family (1993:16). 
And it is these social-structural conditions that make 
delinquent or criminal behavior more or less likely to occur. 
Income influences the social contexts or settings in which 
adolescents develop. According to the NRC report, if 
adolescents develop in an environment marked by low income, an 
economically stressed family, poor housing, poor schools, 
disadvantaged neighborhoods, and poor opportunity, they are 
more likely to turn to crime and criminality. The report 
concludes that economic hardship places adolescents at high 
risk for criminal activity (NRC, 1993:42). The conclusions of 
this panel are that social-structural factors play a key role 
in the emergence of crime and delinquency and in shaping the 
social contexts of the family and the school. Gottfredson and 
Hirschi (1990) pay "lip service" to social-structural factors, 
but that is not where their emphasis lies. As Gibbons (1994) 
notes, while social-structural factors in crime causation are 
mentioned by Gottfredson and Hirschi, they are dismissed as 
being unimportant. Their emphasis remains on the individual 
and their lack of self-control, and on families or schools 
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divorced from their social contexts. 
The clearest evidence that individual explanations are 
inadequate for a complete explanation and understanding of 
crime comes from the fact that crime rates vary over time, by 
nation, by culture, by state, by region, by race, and by other 
such social-structural factors. As Currie asks: 
why are people in St. Louis so much more 
'prone to crime* than those in Stockholm or, 
for that matter, Milwaukee? Why are people 
in Houston not only far more likely to kill 
each other than people in London or Zurich, 
but also much more likely to do so today than 
they were 25 years ago (1985b:427-428)? 
Or, if we take the fact that United States homicide and 
robbery rates far exceed those of all other "developed" 
nations (Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994), how does Gottfredson 
and Hirschi's theory of crime resulting from low self-control 
and "defective" parenting hold up as an explanation? Why does 
"defective" parenting show up when and where it does? Why are 
there more "defective" parents in the United States than in 
Denmark or Japan, which have much lower crime rates? Why does 
the rate of "defective" parenting vary from nation to nation, 
culture to culture, or from one part of the United States to 
another? By focusing upon individuals as the level of 
analysis, and by examining parenting divorced from its social 
context, interdisciplinary theorists like Gottfredson and 
Hirschi (1990) not only commit the "fallacy of autonomy," they 
also fail to examine the social-structural factors that could 
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help explain the wide variations in crime rates between the 
United States and other similar nations. The reduction of 
explanations of crime to individual explanations based on low 
self-control cannot adequately answer these questions and will 
not add to our understanding of crime or to strategies for 
prevention or remediation. 
In summary thus far, while theorists like Gottfredson and 
Hirschi do discuss a few of the social contexts in which crime 
emerges, such as the family and the school, their focus and 
emphasis remains on the individual and the "within-person" 
causes of crime and criminality (1990:256). Indeed, 
Gottfredson and Hirschi emphasize an individual's propensity 
for criminal behavior (1990; and Hirschi and Gottfredson, 
1988). In these theorist's eyes, crime results from a lack of 
self-control, so instead of examining social-structural 
influences on individuals, the family, the school, or other 
institutions, they focus upon differing levels of self-control 
in individuals. Different levels of self-control are 
attributed to the individual's parent's child-rearing skills. 
The fact that child-rearing skills are also influenced by 
social-structural factors such as income inequality or 
economic hardship and stress (e.g.. Conger et al., 1994; NRC, 
1993; Conger et al., 1992; Currie, 1985a), unemployment and 
poverty (e.g., NRC, 1993; Jones, 1988; Currie, 1985a; Wilson, 
1980), is diminished and then dismissed by Gottfredson and 
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Hirschi (1990). The role of these and other social-structural 
influences on crime, such as other forms of social inequality, 
patterns of discrimination, neighborhood, and housing, are 
also dismissed. As Phillips 1991) notes, Gottfredson and 
Hirschi's approach does not address how individual and family 
shortcomings come about in the first place or what might be 
done in terms of policy to remedy such problems. Their theory 
of self-control, as Gibbons points out "...is, at heart, a 
psychological argument" (1994:112). And since they emphasize 
"...self-control to the exclusion of other variables...it is 
not an integrated argument" (Gibbons, 1994:182), or really 
interdisciplinary either. 
The understanding of crime that one gets from Gottfredson 
and Hirschi's (1990) general theory of crime is therefore 
incomplete, and it is also misleading. The theory is 
misleading in that it leads one to think that crime can be 
understood by looking primarily at individuals and their 
parents. The theory is misleading because it takes our 
attention away from any meaningful analysis of the role of the 
social-structure in creating crime. It is misleading because 
it suggests that crime can be remedied if we only "fix" 
parents* parenting skills and an individual's self-control. 
Social-structural factors that could effect parenting, self-
control, and crime remain unexamined and unchallenged. This 
approach diverts attention away from any social-structural 
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factors that contribute to crime and from any needed social-
structural change. And as already discussed, this approach is 
misleading because the authors choose to ignore research that 
contradicts their own research and theory. The relationship 
between parenting and crime is well documented in the 
literature (e.g., Farrington and Hawkins, 1991; Wilson, 1987; 
Loeber and Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986; Hirschi, 1969), and surely 
self-control has something to do with crime. But to prevent 
this as a complete explanation ignores research and evidence 
to the contrary. For example, there is extensive research on 
the negative impact of economic disadvantage on parenting 
(e.g.. Conger et al., 1994; NRC, 1993; Conger et al., 1992; 
Simons, et at., 1992; Dix, 1991; McLoyd, 1990). The factors 
impacting parenting and self-control must also be examined. 
Disturbingly, these authors are not the only ones to engage in 
such reductionism. 
Other criminologists share the individual focus and lack 
of adequate attention to social structure or context found in 
Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) general theory of crime. In 
another interdisciplinary effort, Farrington, Ohlin, and 
Wilson (1986) state that their goal is to develop a case for a 
new research strategy that aims to better understand crime in 
order to prevent it. According to these authors, one of the 
central themes in this endeavor is "...the importance of 
knowing more about individual differences among offenders and 
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nonoffenders" (1986:13). They go on to suggest that "...if we 
wish to reduce the probability of low-rate offenders becoming 
high-rate offenders, we must develop greater insight into far 
more subtle differences among individuals and their circum­
stances" (1986:13). Again, as with Gottfredson and Hirschi 
(1990), the focus is upon the individual. The "circumstances" 
Farrington and colleagues (1986) discuss are such things as 
family differences in producing delinquency (ultimately 
attributable to families' failure to produce and maintain 
strong bonds with their children), parenting abilities 
(including consistent discipline, supervision and monitoring), 
the limitations imposed by the "cognitive and temperamental 
characteristics" of children, the ability of schools to 
produce obedience in their students, the mix of talents and 
abilities of students and teachers, and the ability of 
families to cope with social and economic aspects of their 
environment. Their focus raises several interesting issues. 
First, why only focus on reducing "the probability of 
low-rate offenders becoming high-rate offenders"? Why not 
focus on reducing the development of low-rate offenders in the 
first place? This criticism is acknowledged by the authors, 
but they still go on to focus on identifying "early signs of 
troublesome behavior" in families and schools as a primary 
means of preventing delinquency and crime (Farrington et al., 
1986:95). They do this without developing an agenda for 
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research or prevention that truly aims at preventing crime 
before it begins, or a plan that addresses the structural 
conditions that make crime more likely. Rather than aiming at 
preventing crime, these authors seem determined to address 
crime and delinquency after low-rate offenders have already 
developed. In reality, this approach is not prevention 
oriented at all, the intervention focuses instead on the 
deterrence and control of crime. 
As discussed earlier, since crime rates vary over time, 
by nation, by region of the country, by race, and by gender, 
an examination of the social-structural factors that could 
help us understand these patterns would seem to be the most 
fruitful way to go. But in the theory advanced by Farrington 
and colleagues (1986), the focus is again on the individual to 
explain, understand, and prevent crime. Again, "circum­
stances" are mentioned, but upon examination, these relate to 
individual characteristics or social circumstances that have 
been divorced from their larger social-structural influences 
or context. Their mention of "social and economic aspects" of 
the environment seems to be nothing more than "lip service," 
because the causes of crime, according to these authors, seem 
to lie in individuals, families, and/or schools without 
seriously considering the impact of such factors as economic 
inequality, racism, discrimination, or other such social-
structural factors that contribute to crime. These authors 
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too conunit the fallacy of autonomy. Social and economic 
influences are mentioned, but they are not emphasized or fully 
explored. For example, they emphasize how families cope with 
their economic and social environment (Farrington et al., 
1986:13), not the social and economic conditions themselves 
and their impact on families and children. This is an 
extremely important oversight found in this approach, because 
the bonds of affection in a family, the ability to supervise 
or monitor one's children, the success of parents, the success 
of a school, or the mix of talents and abilities of students 
and teachers, are all likely impacted by economic inequality, 
patterns of discrimination, and/or various other social-
structural conditions in one's community and nation (e.g.. 
Conger et al., 1994; Hagan, 1994; NRC, 1993; Conger et al., 
1992; Simons et al., 1992; Dix, 1991; McLoyd, 1990; Jones, 
1988; Sampson, 1987; Wilson, 1980)—but this link is left 
unexamined. Research demonstrating the importance of social-
structural factors in crime causation will be examined further 
in the next chapter. 
Further evidence of the fallacy of autonomy can be seen 
in Farrington and colleague's (1986) failure to examine 
social-structural factors when they discuss the impact of 
schools on crime. These authors assume a different mix of 
talents and abilities in students and teachers while believing 
that this mix helps to explain differences in a school's 
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"...ability to induce reasonable levels of obedience in their 
pupils..." (Farrington et al., 1986:13), but they don't ask 
where the differences stem from in the first place. Their 
assumption seems to be that these differences are innate or 
arise entirely in families, rather than springing from a 
complex interaction between individuals and their social and 
economic environment. Furthermore, when exploring the 
implications of their analysis for theories of crime and for 
the development of a research strategy for the future, these 
authors pose several questions to be answered by future 
research, including: "Why are parental child-rearing 
techniques, family criminality, the child's troublesome 
behavior, and the child's poor educational attainment the best 
predictors of the onset of offending (Farrington et al., 
1986:57)?" But they fail to include a question about the 
relationship between these "predictors" and socioeconomic 
factors such as income inequality, poverty, and neighborhood. 
And as suggested by the recent NRC report (1993), and by the 
social-structural research on crime to be discussed in the 
next chapter, these factors are critical. 
Curiously, in at least two instances Farrington and 
colleagues cite research that stresses the impact of economic 
deprivation on families and on delinquency, but still conclude 
that the problem lies in the family, or more specifically with 
parenting methods (1986:97,99). For example, after noting the 
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strong relationship in the literature between lax parental 
supervision and delinquency, they include the following quote 
by Wilson; 
The essential point of our findings is the 
very close association of lax parenting meth­
ods with severe social handicap. Lax parent­
ing methods are often the result of chronic 
stress, situations arising from frequent or 
prolonged spells of unemployment, physical 
or mental disabilities among members of the 
family, and an often permanent condition of 
poverty.... If these factors are ignored and 
parental laxness is seen instead as an atti­
tude" which can be shifted by education or by 
punitive measures, then our findings are being 
misrepresented (1980:233-234). 
Farrington and colleagues conclude from all of this that "what 
is needed is...study to isolate the most strategic targets for 
enhancing the effectiveness of parental supervision" 
(1986:99). They choose not to address the social-structural 
factors identified by Wilson, unemployment and poverty, 
instead opting to focus entirely on enhancing parenting 
skills. In this fashion they sidestep the more obvious 
suggestions of the need for social-structural change—even if 
it's only to improve parenting skills. At another point, 
after noting the importance of socieoconomic disadvantage on 
families, on parenting, and on delinquency, Farrington and 
colleagues conclude that "...the persistent association of 
family variables and delinquency supports a major focus on the 
development of intervention programs to remedy critical 
deficiencies in family socialization processes" (1986:97). 
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Again they ignore the social-structural factor—socioeconomic 
disadvantage—that has been suggested by the very research 
they have just cited. These researchers continually refocus 
attention on defective individuals, defective socialization, 
families, and/or parents, while diverting attention away from 
an examination of the existing social-structure. Through 
their focus on socialization processes, the existing normative 
and social-structure is assumed (Mills, 1963). Similar to 
problems that Colvin and Pauly note in their discussion of 
"integrated theories" of crime, this approach fails "...to 
transcend the confines of the micro level, interpersonal 
processes to examine why the various socialization paths are 
arrayed as they are and why distinctive socialization 
sequences are differentially distributed along class lines" 
(1983:525). Throughout their theory, Farrington and 
colleagues (1986) focus on such factors as individual 
abilities and talents, coping skills, parenting skills, or 
temperament, while the existing social-structure and its role 
in creating and/or contributing to crime is left unexamined. 
These theorists, like Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), fail to 
ask how these individual and/or family deficits develop to 
begin with and why they are arrayed as they are. 
Another theory of crime that clearly reflects the trend 
in recent years towards focusing on individuals to the 
exclusion of social-structural factors was developed by Wilson 
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in Thinking About Crime (1983), and by Wilson and Herrnstein 
in Crime and Human Nature (1985). These efforts focus on 
"...explaining criminality rather than crime (Lilly et al, 
1989:195)" and on predispositions or propensities of criminal 
behavior in the individual. Wilson and Herrnstein identify 
constitutional factors "...usually present at or soon after 
birth..." (1985:69) that predispose certain individuals to 
commit crimes. Over the years Wilson (1983) and Wilson and 
Herrnstein (1985) have been criticized extensively in the 
literature for their myopic focus on the individual and their 
lack of serious attention to social-structural factors in 
crime causation (e.g., Scheingold, 1991; Lilly et al., 1989; 
Currie, 1986 and 1985a and b). While Wilson and Herrnstein 
mention that "it is likely that...the tendency to commit crime 
has both constitutional and social origins..." (1985:69), 
their emphasis remains strongly on the individual and 
predispositions to criminality. While claiming "...that 
criminal behavior...results from a complex interaction of 
genetic and environmental factors" (Wilson and Herrnstein, 
1985:70), they "...return relentlessly to criminality as the 
consequence of flawed individuals making the wrong choices" 
(Scheingold, 1991:12). As Scheingold notes, despite their 
claims to being interested in "objective conditions" or 
social-structural causes of crime, "...there is an unmis­
takably volitional inflection to the conclusions drawn by 
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Wilson and Herrnstein" (1991:12). 
Like Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), and Farrington and 
colleagues (1986), Wilson and Herrnstein (1985) focus on the 
individual instead of paying adequate attention to the social-
structural influences on crime. But unlike the other two 
interdisciplinary theories being discussed here, Wilson and 
Herrnstein stress the importance of underlying predispositions 
to commit crime that they believe are, to a large part, 
genetically based. In his critique of Wilson and Herrnstein, 
Kamin states that: 
The book does, of course, contain some appro-
priatley worded comments to the effect that 
the relations between genes and the social en­
vironment are complex, so that the two should 
not be thought of as 'either-or.' Lip service 
aside, however, Wilson and Herrnstein repeat­
edly imply that genes and environment are rad­
ically separate sources of causation, and that 
when variations in the two are correlated, as 
is usually the case, causation resides in the 
genes (1986:27). 
Kamin also claims that Wilson and Herrnstein support their 
arguments through the selective interpretation and 
misinterpretation of the research. This tendency has also 
been noted by Lilly and colleagues (1989). As discussed 
earlier in this dissertation, it has been suggested that 
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) also selectively reviewed the 
literature and ignored data in order to support their theory 
(Polk, 1991). It appears that Wilson and Herrnstein (1985) 
were determined to support their individual and socio-
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biological theory of crime regardless of the evidence. 
Regarding the family, as with the other two theories 
previously discussed, Wilson and Herrnstein (1985) also stress 
the importance of parenting abilities in preventing 
delinquency and crime. And also like the other theories, the 
family is examined divorced from its larger social context. 
Unlike Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) and Farrington and 
colleagues (1986), Wilson and Herrnstein (1985) go further by 
stressing the role of genetically transmitted family traits 
predisposing some to crime. The problems and fallacies 
related to their genetic argument will be discussed in the 
following section on the assumptions regarding human nature in 
these interdisciplinary theories of crime. Suffice it to say 
that if crime is genetically based, it would have to be 
concluded that the gene pool in the United States is badly 
"polluted" given our relatively very high crime rates— 
especially in the case of violent crime. We would also have 
to be able to explain why people become less criminal as they 
grow older, a pattern common today that has been well 
established in the literature on crime. If genes "caused" 
their initial criminality, do their genes then mutate in such 
a consistent pattern that they become non-criminal "by nature" 
as they mature? Wilson and Herrnstein's focus on "natural" 
causes of criwe functions to take attention away from the 
larger social context in which families live and in which 
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crime emerges. 
The problems found in the examples of interdisciplinary 
theories of crime discussed in this dissertation are common in 
the interdisciplinary literature on crime today. For example, 
Hawkins, Catalano, and Miller (1992), Farrington and Hawkins 
(1991), and Loeber and Stouthamer-Loeber (1986), all emphasize 
the importance of good parenting skills (such as monitoring 
and supervision of children) in preventing crime and 
delinquency, but they fail to connect parenting to the larger 
social context. These theorists also embrace variations of a 
control theory perspective which accepts the existing 
normative structure, focuses on the individual "out-of-
control," and ignores the importance of social-structural 
factors in influencing parenting skills, socialization, and 
the development of social bonds to begin with. For example, 
Farrington and Hawkins (1991) note structural influences on 
families and delinquency, but then ignore the implications of 
these insights in their conclusions and recommendations. As 
with the other theories discussed in this study, these 
perspectives, while claiming to be interdisciplinary, lack 
serious consideration and analysis of the impact of 
sociological and structural factors on crime, and are 
therefore incomplete and not adequately interdisciplinary. 
These perspectives direct our attention away from any needed 
social-structural changes. 
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An example of the aforementioned redirection of our 
attention away from the social-structure to individuals, or to 
institutions divorced from the social-structure, can be found 
in Hawkins' and colleague's (1992) discussion of risk and 
protective factors for adolescent drug abuse and delinquency. 
These authors identify economic deprivation, poor family 
management practices, family conflict, and low bonding to the 
family, among other risk factors, as increasing the risk of 
drug abuse or delinquency. However, when their solutions 
surface, they suggest such programs as parent training and 
social competence promotion as means of prevention. They 
discuss the importance of monitoring and supervision of 
children but do not address the social-structural factors, 
such as economic stress and disadvantage, that influence these 
and other parenting skills (e.g.. Conger et al., 1994; NRC, 
1993; Conger et al., 1992). Additionally, while economic 
deprivation is brought up as a risk factor, they develop no 
plan to address this problem. The literature Hawkins and 
colleagues (1992) cited which addresses economic deprivation 
stresses interventions and support programs to help people 
cope with their deprivation rather than addressing directly 
the deprivation itself and ways of eliminating or minimizing 
such economic inequality. As with the other theories 
discussed in this dissertation, Hawkins and colleagues mention 
social-structural factors in crime causation, but that is not 
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where their emphasis lies. The role of social-structural 
factors in crime causation and the need for structural changes 
and programs to address crime are not explored. 
In summary, the interdisciplinary criminological theories 
examined in this study focus on the individual in attempting 
to explain and understand crime. And when these theorists do 
examine an aspect of the social-structure, setting, or context 
as a factor influencing the likelihood of crime, such as the 
family, they commit the "fallacy of autonomy"—they all focus 
on the individual or institutions influencing the individual 
to the exclusion of social-structural factors influencing 
both. To say, for example, that the family, the school, the 
community, or the peer group are unaffected by such factors as 
patterns of economic and racial inequality ignores important 
sociological research on the family and on crime (e.g.. Conger 
et al., 1994; Hagan, 1994; NRC, 1993; Currie, 1985a). As 
Currie (1985a) remarked, there is indeed a curious interest 
among some theorists with the "under the roof culture" of the 
family, but an equally curious lack of interest in the larger 
culture that shapes and continues to influence the family and 
the occurrence of crime and delinquency. In addition, each of 
the interdisciplinary theories critiqued in this dissertation 
represent variants of control theories—theories emphasizing 
the importance of social control, self-restraint, and bonds to 
others in preventing crime. Control theories also fail to 
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recognize the importance of social-structural factors in 
generating crime and in developing, maintaining, and severing 
social bonds. Control theories also accept the existing 
normative structure, "...the structure of authority and 
actions of social control agents as an unexamined given" 
(Colvin and Pauly, 1983). Therefore, non-structural 
interdisciplinary criminology, like conservative criminology, 
"...stacks the deck in favor of 'individual' explanations by 
simply choosing to ignore the implications of variations in 
'antisocial' behavior across different social strata, racial 
and ethnic groups, or countries" (Currie, 1985a:217). These 
approaches are misleading because they lead us to think that 
we can explain, understand, and address crime without an 
analysis of the role of the social-structure in creating 
crime. They suggest that if we only "fix" parenting skills 
and control unruly natures we can prevent or stop crime. 
Social-structural factors that effect parenting, self-control, 
bonding, and crime remain unexamined and unchallenged. This 
approach diverts attention away from any social-structural 
factors that contribute to crime and from any needed social-
structural change. The interests expressed in such approaches 
and their limitations will be addressed further as the domain 
assumptions present in these theories are examined. 
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Domain Assumptions 
Other areas of difficulty for interdisciplinary 
criminology become evident through an examination of domain or 
"background" assumptions. An understanding of the assumptions 
at the base of these theories will provide a more complete 
understanding of their nature and character while also gaining 
insight into the interests and ideologies they reflect. 
Different assumptions and ideas regarding the nature of human 
kind and society shape any social investigation (Gouldner, 
1970; Strasser, 1976), including the orientation to the study 
of crime and delinquency (Michalowski, 1977) . To begin, the 
assumptions regarding human nature present in the theories of 
crime being examined in this study will be explored. 
Hiiman Nature 
The view on holds regarding human nature significantly 
shapes the subsequent investigation of crime and the theories 
one develops or accepts (Michalowski, 1977; Gouldner, 1970). 
If a theorist believes that people are prone to crime by their 
nature, then the focus of their explanation of crime is likely 
to be on the individual rather than on the role of the social-
structure in creating crime. If instead, human nature is 
viewed as malleable and shaped by social circumstances, the 
theorist is likely to focus on the role of such factors as 
economic inequality, opportunity, and racism in generating 
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crime, rather than appealing to individual differences in 
criminals. Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) view of human 
nature, and the views of control theories in general, fall 
into the first camp. 
In their general theory of crime, Gottfredson and Hirschi 
(1990) embrace what they term the "classical" image of human 
nature. The authors speak of "universal desires" (1990:273) 
and state that "...human behavior is motivated by the self-
interested pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain" 
(1990:175).2 Crime for these theorists results from an 
attempt to enhance pleasure and avoid pain in those lacking 
self-control (1990:175). Furthermore, they say that 
"...people naturally pursue their own interests and unless 
socialized to the contrary will use whatever means are 
available to them for such purposes" (1990:117). In an 
earlier article, Hirschi and Gottfredson conclude from their 
reading of the biological literature on crime that "...there 
is considerable evidence that heritable individual character­
istics play a significant role in crime causation" (1988:9). 
But in their general theory of crime they reject the idea that 
there are born criminals or genes that transmit criminality 
(Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990:96). However, in speaking of 
"universal desires," a self-seeking human nature, and people 
driven to satisfy their own interests, even at the expense of 
others if not controlled by socialization or held in check by 
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self- and/or social controls, it is clear that Gottfredson and 
Hirschi have very definite ideas regarding human nature and 
their view is one of an innately selfish human being. Their 
view of human nature is in fact similar to that of Freud's 
(1961). Freud viewed human beings as self-seeking and driven 
by instincts until we are forced to renounce our instincts by 
external social controls, which then leads to the development 
of internal controls. This sounds suspiciously like 
Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) claim that crime is caused by 
a lack of self-control, driven by "universal desires," and 
resulting from inadequate socialization. Both views downplay 
the sociological view on the role of the social-structure and 
culture in shaping what is considered "human nature" and in 
leading to crime. These assumptions regarding human nature 
are at the foundation of Gottfredson and Hirschi's general 
theory of crime based on low self-control. 
The assumptions regarding human nature are not stated as 
clearly in the theory of crime developed by Farrington and 
colleagues (1986), although these authors do seem to share 
many of the views of Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) on human 
nature, including embracing control theory assumptions of a 
self-interested human nature in need of self- and social 
control. Farrington and colleagues discuss "temperament," 
while stating that "psychologists believe that temperament is 
to some degree inherited" (1986:6). And later, in discussing 
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an earlier theory developed by Farrington, people are viewed 
as being hedonistic and rational (Farrington et al., 1986:59). 
In several instances these authors state that criminality 
could be caused in part by genetic factors, and they minimize 
the importance of social-structural and economic factors in 
crime causation (as previously discussed). For example, there 
is an assumption throughout their discussion of temperament 
that it is somehow inherited, a part of the "baggage" that 
comes with a particular parent or child. The possibility that 
temperament develops in a process of social interaction 
influenced by social-structural realities is not seriously 
considered. When discussing temperament, these authors again 
commit the fallacy of autonomy. And while lacking a clear 
statement of their assumptions regarding human nature, their 
discussion of temperament, genetics, their mention of 
hedonism, rationality, their focus on the individual, 
families, and schools, the importance of socialization, 
supervision, and social control, all suggest a view similar 
to that of Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990). 
While Farrington and colleagues (1986), lack a clear 
statement of their assumptions regarding human nature, Wilson 
and Herrnstein (1985) are very clear on their assumptions. Of 
the three theories focused on in detail in this dissertation, 
Wilson and Herrnstein's explanation and understanding of crime 
is based most heavily on their assumptions regarding human 
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nature. The authors state that their book "...is an effort to 
set forth an understanding of human nature by examining one 
common, if regrettable, manifestation of that nature— 
criminality" (Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985:19). In fact, they 
go on to say that "...crime is universal..." but fail to 
adequately explain just why this universal "human nature" 
manifests itself in crime more often in some places and times 
than others. They address the issue of differences in crime 
rates but conclude that to find an explanation, "...one cannot 
begin with the society as a whole or its historical context, 
for what needs explanation is not the behavior of 'society' 
but the behavior of individuals making up society" (Wilson and 
Herrnstein, 1985:20). Crime is attributed to "constitutional 
factors" with social influences playing a minor contributing 
role. But as previously noted, even though Wilson and 
Herrnstein pay "lip service" to social origins of crime, their 
focus is upon constitutional factors and individual choices 
predisposing some to commit criminal acts (e.g., Scheingold, 
1991; Kamin, 1986; Currie, 1985a&b). 
Whatever one thinks about the views of human nature 
expressed by Wilson and Herrnstein (1985), Farrington and 
colleagues (1986), or Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), they are 
simply not helpful in understanding or explaining crime. As 
Currie points out, this view of human nature "...cannot tell 
us why some times, some places, and some groups are more 
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criminal than others" (1985a:187). How can the conceptions of 
human nature offered by these theorists explain the facts 
regarding crime? For example, in 1993, Detroit, Michigan had 
581 homicides while Toronto, the largest and most racially 
diverse city in Canada, had only 53 (Lazaro, 1994). Is human 
nature in Canada that different from human nature in the 
United States? The robbery rate in the U.S. in 1988 of 221 
robberies per 100,000 people was twice as high as the 
industrial nation with next-highest rate, four to five times 
higher than most other industrial nations, and 158 times 
higher than the rate in Japan (Messner and Rosenfeld, 
1994:22). The homicide rate in the U.S. in 1988 of 8.9 
homicides per 100,000 people was three times higher than the 
closest industrial nation, and more than seven times greater 
than other industrial nations (Messner and Rosenfeld, 
1994:22). If the explanation of these facts lies in our 
"nature," the rates of these and other crimes should be at 
least somewhat constant across nations. The fact that these 
crime rates vary so much by nation suggest that there are 
differing social conditions that could better explain these 
phenomena. Human nature alone can't explain these facts 
regarding crime. A more sociological view of "human nature" 
and a structural and reflexive criminology can. 
There is an alternative view of human nature that fits 
better with the facts regarding crime. Simply stated, this 
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view holds that social conditions and culture shape what some 
call "human nature." Indeed, it is not primarily "nature" 
that shapes human behavior, it is the social conditions and 
settings in which we live out our daily lives. In this 
perspective, there is no inherent, invariant human nature. 
According to this viewpoint, expressed clearly by Marx, 
"...the essence of man is not an abstraction inherent in each 
particular individual. The real nature of man is the totality 
of social relations" (1956:68). In this scheme, we are 
neither "good" nor "evil," but can be either depending upon 
the social conditions in which we live out our lives. Whether 
a society fosters self-interest or concern for others and the 
common good, depends upon the nature of social relations in 
that society. This is not a call for a "blank slate" view of 
human nature. Even though Marx believed that what is called 
"human nature" is actually the culmination of social and 
productive relations, he still felt that people are endowed 
with certain powers and needs that "make" us human (Oilman, 
1976:74). This is a call for a criminology that recognizes 
that even with our endowments, whatever they may be, human 
behavior is largely shaped by and through social processes. 
What Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), Farrington and colleagues 
(1986), Wilson (1983), and Wilson and Herrnstein (1986) call 
"human nature," such as a self-interested pursuit of pleasure, 
is in fact a reflection of a historically specific conception 
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of human nature that reflects the social system and ruling 
ideas of the age. In this view, "human nature" is largely a 
reflection of the social relations engendered by particular 
social and economic arrangements. 
Given the importance of the social-structure and social 
relations in helping to shape our "nature," the fact that the 
theories of crime discussed in this dissertation de-emphasize 
those relations surfaces as a major limitation of these 
approaches. In addition, the lack of attention to, or denial 
of social-structural "causes" of crime severely restricts 
their ability to explain, understand, or deal with crime in 
terms of prevention or remediation. By positing a self-
interested, self-seeking, or a criminal human nature, these 
perspectives focus our attention on the individuals involved 
in crime while directing it away from the social-structural 
conditions that can lead to crime. As Lilly and colleagues 
note, "...attempts to root crime in human nature exempt the 
social fabric from blame and lend credence to the idea that 
offenders are largely beyond reform and in need of punitive 
control" (1989:199). All three theories assume the existence 
of an invariant human nature, ignore or minimize the role of 
the social-structure in shaping human behavior, ignore or 
minimize the role of the social-structure in generating crime, 
and emphasize control measures to address crime. Any theory 
that shares a control theory focus with its assumptions on 
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human nature, or an emphasis on a self-interested human nature 
with predispositions to criminality, would suffer from these 
same limitations. To further understand the character of 
these interdisciplinary theories of crime while also learning 
more about the interests and ideologies they express, their 
assumptions regarding the nature of society will be examined 
next. Like assumptions regarding human nature, the assump­
tions one holds regarding the nature of society shapes any 
subsequent social investigation (Gouldner, 1970), including 
the investigation of crime. 
The Nature of Society 
Every social theory, including those on crime, contain 
domain assumptions regarding the nature of society that 
influence their explanation, understanding, and possible 
courses of action to address crime. As Gouldner (1970) noted, 
these assumptions reflect our personal experiences and 
sentiments and they facilitate particular courses of action or 
inaction regarding social phenomena. Among these assumptions 
are beliefs and attitudes regarding the possibility and 
desirability of social change. For example, if a crimi­
nologist believes that crime is the unavoidable result of 
human nature, then it would do no good to restructure society 
to address crime. In this sense, the nature of society is 
such that it cannot be changed. The focus would instead be on 
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control of individuals engaged in crime, since changing their 
nature would not be possible. These domain assumptions 
regarding the nature of society influence what a theorist 
thinks can be done in and about the world. According to 
Gouldner: 
...domain assumptions entail beliefs about 
what is real in the world and thus have impli­
cations about what it is possible to do, to 
change in the world; the values they entail 
indicate what courses of action are desirable 
and thus shape conduct. In this sense, every 
theory and every theorist ideologizes social 
reality (1970; 47-48). 
The domain assumptions or guiding interests found in the 
interdisciplinary theories of crime discussed in this study 
assume a human nature that is in need of control. Further­
more, these perspectives see crime arising out of individuals, 
who for one reason or another, lack self-control or self-
restraint. The focus for blame and change is upon the 
individual. The existing social and normative structure are 
accepted as they are. 
The theories of crime proposed by Gottfredson and Hirschi 
(1990), Farrington and colleagues (1986), Wilson (1983), and 
Wilson and Herrnstein (1985), de-emphasize the role of social-
structure in their explanations and understanding of crime, 
and do not seriously entertain the possibility of social-
structural changes in order to address crime. The status quo 
is assumed as legitimate and individuals, families, and 
schools are expected to adjust to the demands of our economic 
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and social reality. For example, Farrington and colleagues 
state that families able to prevent delinquency in their 
children do so because of their ability to develop strong 
bonds of affection with their children, their effective 
parenting skills, and because of their ability to cope with 
"... the economic and social aspects of their environment" 
(1986:13). According to Gottfredson and Hirschi, "...the 
state is neither the cause nor the solution to crime" 
(1990:272). In their view, it is individuals who lack self-
control over their "universal desires" that "cause" crime. 
Furthermore, poor parenting is viewed as the primary cause of 
individuals with low self-control. Wilson and Herrnstein 
(1985) focus on underlying predispositions and constitutional 
factors that lead to criminality instead of examining 
criminogenic factors in the social-structure. In fact, Wilson 
has gone so far as to say that "we have made our society and 
we must live with it" (1983:249). In all three of these 
cases, the focus in on the individual in addressing crime and 
in adapting to the status quo while social-structural change 
is seen as undesirable and unnecessary. The possibility of 
altering or restructuring the existing social and economic 
order or opportunities is not considered. 
One of the consequences of the views discussed above, 
coupled with the view of a self-interested pleasure-maximizing 
human nature, is that the "blame" for crime is directed away 
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from the existing social order and on to "defective" others 
that are somehow "different" from law-abiding citizens. This 
practice involves pointing "...to the different ones as the 
source of a problem, so we don't have to change our lifestyle 
or take responsibility for the problem" (Kappeler, 1993:14). 
As long as the blame for crime is placed on individuals, their 
nature, or their families, social change is not seen as 
necessary or desirable. In building upon C. Wright Mills' 
(1963) analysis of social problems, Ryan adds that: 
Within such a framework...deviation from norms 
and standards comes to be defined as failed or 
incomplete socialization—failure to learn the 
rules or the inability to learn how to keep 
them. Those with social problems are then 
viewed as unable or unwilling to adjust to 
society's standards.... 
In defining social problems in this way, the 
social pathologists are, of course, ignoring 
a whole set of factors that ordinarily might 
be considered relevant—for instance, unequal 
distribution of income, social stratification, 
political struggle, ethnic and racial group 
conflict, and inequality of power. Their ide­
ology concentrates almost exclusively on the 
failure of the deviant. To the extent that 
society plays any part in social problems, it 
is said to have somehow failed to socialize 
the individual...(Ryan, 1976:14-15). 
The focus of Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), and Farrington 
and colleagues (1986), is upon the individual and their 
socialization within the social contexts of the family and the 
school, while ignoring the significant social structural 
factors discussed by Ryan. Wilson and Herrnstein (1985) also 
ignore these social-structural factors with their emphasis on 
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the individual, socialization, and constitutional predis­
positions to criminality. By blaming human nature, faulty 
socialization, and individuals out of control, and by blaming 
parents and schools, the status quo remains unquestioned and 
unchallenged. Given this understanding, individuals, 
families, and schools are "blamed" for crime and need to be 
changed in order to prevent or reduce crime. This 
understanding serves as an effective ideology to justify and 
maintain the status quo by directing "blame" away from the 
social-structure as a source of crime. The need or 
possibility for social change is rendered unnecessary and 
undesirable. 
As discussed above, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), 
Farrington and colleagues (1986), and Wilson and Herrnstein 
(1985) focus on faulty socialization as a major cause of 
crime. Given this framework, the norms, roles, and values 
that people are supposed to be socialized to are assumed and 
not questioned. As Mills has observed, the normative 
structures behind the content of what is to be socialized is 
left unexamined by theorists calling for more effective 
socialization as a solution to norm violation (1963:533). 
Also left unexamined are the origins of the norms and the 
reasons for differences in socialization processes and 
outcomes in families (Colvin and Pauly, 1983). But most 
importantly, these perspectives fail to examine why 
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socialization "fails" to begin with. Perhaps a social-
structural factor (or factors) "causes" both failed 
socialization and crime. The focus on failed socialization 
leads to viewing problems as individual, rather than as 
problems in the structure of society. This orientation will 
find social change unnecessary and undesirable. This bias and 
domain assumption represents another important limitation of 
these theories of crime. 
The perspectives discussed in this dissertation claim to 
be interdisciplinary theories of all crime, but they in fact 
ignore social-structural insights found in a sociological 
perspective on crime while catering to conservative values and 
interests. With their individual focus, their lack of 
attention to social-structural factors in addressing crime, 
their preference for maintaining the status quo, these 
perspectives are not comprehensive enough or adequately 
interdisciplinary. As Lilly and colleagues have noted in 
their critique of conservative criminology, these views 
"...pay little attention to crime's social roots" and they 
assume that the "...offenders' social circumstances are either 
unfixable or unimportant in crime causation" (1989:204). 
Before discussing just what policy implications emanate from 
these reductionist approaches to explaining and understanding 
crime, a philosophical error that effects both the theory and 
practice of interdisciplinary criminology will be discussed. 
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Alienated Criminology 
The interdisciplinary theories of crime being analyzed in 
this dissertation suffer from an alienated view of humankind, 
society, and crime. They fail to recognize that our society, 
culture, form of government, market economy, social institu­
tions, patterns of social interaction, values, beliefs, and 
"nature" are all human social creations. This significant and 
basic sociological insight suggests that since these things 
are social creations, they can all be modified or changed. 
What the theories of crime discussed call "human nature" is 
also a social creation, and this "nature" too can be changed 
or modified. If on the other hand we assume, as do 
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), that human beings are driven 
by "universal desires," or that "constitutional" factors 
predispose some to be criminal (Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985), 
then we have precluded the possibility or changing what is 
called "human nature" through changing our institutions or 
values, and we are left with the option of only controlling an 
otherwise unruly human nature or predisposition. In addition 
to ignoring social-structural factors in crime causation, this 
view of human nature and of society reflects an alienation 
from our own creations. In the alternative view, we create 
through social processes what we call "human nature" and we 
create the institutions and values that shape that "nature" 
and our behavior. Whatever capacities an individual is born 
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with, the complete human being that we become with our values, 
beliefs, attitudes, and personality, emerges in a social 
process within which individual characteristics and capacities 
interact with social forces. By failing to consider this, the 
interdisciplinary criminologies of Gottfredson and Hirschi 
(1990), Farrington and colleagues (1986), Wilson (1983), and 
Wilson and Herrnstein (1985), explain, understand, and address 
"human nature" only after assuming that "what is," has to be. 
There is an alternative sociological viewpoint that does not 
suffer from this alienated view of human kind, one that does 
not regard the particular manifestation of human nature as 
eternal. 
Our society and our "nature" are social creations. But 
when these creations are endowed with a power external to 
their human creators, this is the essence of alienation as 
conceived by Marx (Vogel, 1988). When we see these creations 
as ruling over us rather than as our creations, we remain 
alienated from our real (social) world. Through social 
action, and the recognition that these institutions and the 
"human nature" they help to shape are social creations, human 
beings have the power to remake their world and their "nature" 
into forms that are consistent with human needs. Vogel states 
that "alienation...is...a single phenomenon, in which the 
products of our action—social institutions as well as 
physical objects—appear as external and independent forces 
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whose connectedness to us has been lost" (1988:376). 
Similarly, Berger and Luckmann warn of reification whereby 
human phenomena are apprehended as if they are things 
(1967:89). According to Berger and Luckmann: 
reification implies that man is capable of 
forgetting his own authorship of the human 
world, and further, that the dialectic between 
man, the producer, and his products is lost to 
consciousness. The reified world is, by def­
inition, a dehumanized world. It is experienced 
by man as a strange facticity, an opus alienum 
over which he has no control rather than as the 
opus proprixun of his own productive activity 
(1967:89) . 
To overcome alienation we must learn to recognize "...that 
these forces are the result of our own action, and thus that 
they can be controlled, that their Naturwuchsigkeit can be 
eliminated" (Vogel, 1988:380). In this view, the particular 
form "human nature" takes in a historical epoch is a reflec­
tion of the dominant social order, its ruling ideas, and the 
social relations it engenders. As Marx argued, in capitalism, 
with its alienated labor, "...man not only produces his 
relation to the object, and to the process of production as 
alien and hostile men; he also produces the relation of other 
men to his production and his product, and the relation 
between himself and other men" (Marx, 1956:169). If the 
nature of these relations is changed, we will have changed 
what has been regarded as "human nature" in addition to 
changing the structure of society. Approaching crime and 
delinquency from this enlightened viewpoint enables us to 
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address "root causes" through altering what alienated 
criminology calls "human nature" by altering the structure of 
society and its institutions, a structure that is assumed by 
alienated criminology. As Groves and Sampson note, "the 
bottom line...is that since society is a human product it is 
amenable to conscious planning and rational control" 
(1986:564). 
A central characteristic of alienation according to Marx 
involves "...the separation of what does not allow separation 
without distortion" (Oilman, 1976:47). The dissociation of 
crime from the structure of society is a related and 
fundamental problem in the theories of crime being examined in 
this study. The French writer, Jacques Ellul sees "dissoci­
ation" as a fundamental problem in our way of thinking about 
the world. 
In the realities of the world and society we 
dissociate and separate those things which can 
certainly be distinguished but which are in 
fact complementary and inseparable. Thus we 
separate the individual and society.... Our 
mode of thinking is also reductionist and one-
dimensional. We are prepared to see only one 
object, to reduce what we can see to a single 
dimension, to eliminate all difficulties and 
details and singularities. Formed by science, 
technique, and the media, our thinking is not 
global and complex, like reality—it is dis­
abled (1990:221). 
The individual focus and assumptions regarding human nature 
found in interdisciplinary criminology are examples of 
dissociation. The individual is examined based on a view of 
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human nature that is separated from its social context, and 
the complex problem of crime is reduced to an issue of 
inadequate controls and a self-interested unrestrained human 
nature. The existing social structure and its influences are 
left unexamined. It social contextual influences are 
considered at all, such as the family and the school, these 
contexts are dissociated from the larger society (the fallacy 
of autonomy). The understanding of crime that emerges from 
such a view is bound to be incomplete, and in Ellul's 
terminology, "disabled." We instead need a view of crime that 
addresses the complexity of crime as a social phenomenon, one 
that does not dissociate crime from its larger context or 
suffer from an alienated view of human kind, human nature and 
the social world that we create. 
Alienation also surfaces as a problem in the process of 
studying crime. A perspective that overcomes an alienated, 
reified, and dissociated view of crime must be prepared to 
address the limitations and assumptions found in a traditional 
scientific approach to the study of crime. As Gouldner notes 
(1970), the study of social phenomena as a "natural science" 
contains domain assumptions that reflect an alienated view of 
our social world. To view a social phenomenon, such as crime, 
as if it is a natural phenomenon reflects a failure to possess 
the social world that we have created (Gouldner, 1970:53). A 
sociological, structural, and reflexive criminology would 
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provide us with an understanding of crime that is not guilty 
of alienation, reification, or dissociation—an understanding 
that embraces the social world we have created. A reflexive 
criminology recognizes the importance of social-structural 
factors in shaping "human nature," one's society, and crime, 
while also recognizing that society is a human social 
creation. Berger and Luckmann stressed the importance of such 
a viewpoint in this well-known passage; 
society is a hman product. Society is an 
objective reality. Man is a social product. 
It may also already be evident than an anal­
ysis of the social world that leaves out any 
one of these three moments will be distortive 
(1966:61). 
As Pfohl notes, "we are, at once, creative and created ritual 
agents—self-structuring subjects and structurally subjected 
selves" (1994:505). We can restructure society and 
restructure ourselves and our "nature" in the process. The 
interdisciplinary theories of crime critiqued in this 
dissertation do not recognize the reflexive and reciprocal 
relationship between the individual and the social-structure. 
This problem is most evident in Wilson's comment in discussing 
what can be done to address crime in the United States—"we 
have made our society and we must live with it" (1983:249). 
Wilson acknowledges the human and social origins of society, 
but then reifies the existing social arrangements. This 
clearly reflects an alienated and dissociated view of men and 
women in society. As will be seen from examining the policy 
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implications of interdisciplinary criminology, the solutions 
that emanate from such an alienated, dissociated, and dis-
tortive view are inadequate for dealing with the reality of 
crime. 
Policy Implications 
As has already been noted, the theory of crime that one 
embraces has consequences in terms of policies designed to 
address crime (e.g., Lilly et al., 1989). The policy 
implications and directions emerging out of the inter­
disciplinary perspectives being examined in this dissertation 
focus on changing individuals, their families, and schools. 
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) argue that the cause of crime 
is low self-control resulting primarily from ineffective 
child-rearing. The solutions they suggest take the form of 
parent-skills training and education, and programs designed to 
bolster social controls. Gottfredson and Hirschi argue that: 
because low self-control arises in the ab­
sence of the powerful inhibiting forces of 
early childhood, it is highly resistant to 
the less powerful inhibiting forces of later 
life, especially the relatively weak forces 
of the criminal justice system (1990:255). 
Focusing on the "within-person" causes of crime and the 
importance of early development and socialization, Gottfredson 
and Hirschi emphasize teaching individuals self-control— 
"...trouble is likely unless something is done to train the 
child to forego immediate gratification in the interest of 
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long-term benefits" (1990:269). Adults; 
...need only learn the requirements of early 
childhood socialization, namely, to watch for 
and recognize signs of low self-control and 
to punish them. Effective and efficient crime 
prevention that produces enduring consequences 
would thus focus on parents or adults with 
responsibilities for child-rearing (Gottfred-
son and Hirschi, 1990:269). 
After claiming that crime results from lack of individual 
self-control, Gottfredson and Hirschi state flatly that 
"...the state is neither the cause of nor the solution to 
crime" (1990:272). Since in their view self-control is 
learned under familial supervision and control, they state 
that: 
apart from the limited benefits that can be 
achieved by making specific criminal acts 
more difficult, policies directed toward en­
hancement of the ability of familial institu­
tions to socialize children are the only real­
istic long-term state policies with potential 
for substantial crime reduction (Gottfredson 
and Hirschi, 1990:272-273). 
So Gottfredson and Hirschi's solutions to crime come down to 
such strategies as "target hardening" and vague policies 
designed to enhance parenting skills. Again, the status quo 
is accepted and the role of social-structural factors in crime 
causation are ignored. The individual, the family, and the 
school are divorced from the influences of any and all social-
structural factors such as income inequality, unemployment, 
poverty, and racial inequality. In addition, while focusing 
on a human nature driven by "universal desires" and low self-
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control as the causes of crime, Gottfredson and Hirschi 
sidestep the issue of the existing wide variations in crime 
rates between the United states and other industrial nations. 
In the last two paragraphs of their book, Gottfredson and 
Hirschi attempt to recover from some of the major "oversights" 
of their general theory of crime by stating that: 
...left unexplored...are its implications for 
the nature and origins of values, for the 
distinction between criminal and civil law, 
for intergroup conflict, and for the structure 
and functioning of complex organizations, be 
they educational, legal or economic. After 
all, a general theory of crime must be a gen­
eral theory of the social order (1990:274). 
The problem is, these authors have just spent an entire text 
dismissing, discounting, and discrediting just such 
explanations by ignoring these and other social-structural 
factors. The fact that they end by lamenting the exclusion of 
these factors does not diminish their claim that the cause of 
all crime is low self-control. And it does not change the 
fact that they claim that the state is not the solution or the 
cause of crime (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990:272). It seems 
instead that these authors are more concerned with "covering" 
their academic reputations than with presenting a compre­
hensive and nonreductionist theory of crime. In spite of the 
inclusion of these lamentations, the theory and policy 
recommendations presented by Gottfredson and Hirschi are based 
on a theory of crime that ignores the social-structure in 
favor of an individualistic perspective that considers the 
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family and the school, only when stripped of their social 
context and influences. These factors could have been at 
least briefly discussed. Dropping social-structural factors 
in at the end of their treatise does not excuse their ex­
clusion from the discussion throughout, or their advocacy of a 
theory and policy that ignores such factors. 
Inadequate attention to social-structural factors in 
theory and in policy recommendations is also a major 
limitation of the approach advocated by Farrington and 
colleagues (1986). These authors suggest that we focus our 
attention on identifying and treating offenders at an early 
stage in their development in order to prevent them from 
becoming involved in criminal careers. Furthermore, they 
suggest that families and schools are the "natural" place to 
start "...the search for early signs of troublesome behavior" 
(Farrington et al., 1986:95). An obvious flaw in this 
approach is that these types of policies or programs wait for 
early signs of criminality to develop rather than focusing on 
the prevention of the emergence of criminality in the first 
place. This approach treats the symptom while failing to 
address the causes of early offending. In addition, programs 
designed to identify early offenders carry the potential for 
mass violations of civil liberties, harassment of "potential 
offenders," and class bias in definition of "troublesome 
behavior." Additionally, as Hagan notes, "...the capacity to 
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predict future careers in crime is limited" (1994:164). 
Other policy suggestions from Farrington and colleagues 
(1986) theory of crime emphasize the role of familial and 
educational institutions is the socialization of children and 
the role of socialization in preventing criminality. Like 
Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), these authors stress the 
importance of maintaining close bonds between family members 
to facilitate the effective socialization of children and to 
prevent crime. Given this understanding, Farrington and 
colleagues emphasize "...prevention measures directed at 
family and school experiences..." (1986:95). In particular, 
programs are suggested that would aim at strengthening 
parenting skills such as supervision and monitoring. Their 
focus on parental supervision and control, and the social­
ization process within the family, subject their theory to the 
same criticisms as that of Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) 
general theory of crime discussed above. As has been 
discussed, good parenting, a strong parent-child bond, and 
effective socialization certainly have something to do with 
crime, but this is not the whole picture. Social-structural 
factors are mentioned, but are largely ignored in Farrington 
and colleagues (1986) theory of crime. Their emphasis on the 
individual, the family, and the school, again detached from 
their social contexts and influences, demonstrate their 
underlying assumptions and biases. These authors arrive at 
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their conclusions in spite of evidence that they themselves 
cite that strongly suggest the importance of social-structural 
variables in causing crime (e.g., 1986:99). As previously 
discussed, research is cited to support their emphasis on the 
importance of parenting skills in crime causation, while 
literature that emphasizes social-structural factors that 
influence parenting abilities, parent-child bonds, and 
successful socialization is ignored. 
Similar policy implications can be found in the theories 
of crime offered by Wilson (1983), and Wilson and Herrnstein 
(1985). In his book, Thinking About Crime (1983), Wilson 
expresses a view that there is little one can do about crime. 
According to Wilson, "the factors that most directly influence 
crime—family structure, moral development, the level of 
personal freedom—are the very things that we cannot easily 
change" (1983:247). After stating that we must live with the 
society we have created, Wilson adds that "...we must labor as 
patiently as we can to make a liberal society work and to make 
the best and sanest use of our laws to control behavior 
without feeling embarrassed that by invoking 'The Law,• we are 
denying our liberal creed" (1983:249). Wilson's view clearly 
reflects an alienated criminology where we are incapable of 
changing the world we have created to address crime. The 
collaborative effort by Wilson and Herrnstein (1985), has very 
little new to offer the student of crime or the policy maker. 
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In fact, they go as far as to say that their argument is not 
"...an argument from which many (possibly any) clear policy 
recommendations can be deduced" (Wilson and Herrnstein, 
1985:514). While accepting the status quo, the major policy 
recommendations that can be deduced are for strengthening 
families, improving parenting skills, increasing punishment, 
and intensification of social control measures in the family 
and schools. The "solutions," as difficult as they are to 
find, turn out to be similar to those proposed by Gottfredson 
and Hirschi (1990), Farrington and colleagues (1986), and by 
control theories in general. As with these theorists, Wilson 
and Herrnstein diminish the importance of social-structural 
factors in crime causation. 
So the solutions to crime embraced by the theories 
discussed in this dissertation revolve around such things as 
strengthening families, parent-training programs, changing 
individuals, teaching self-control, and controlling "universal 
desires" and unruly natures through effective socialization. 
Individuals, their families, and their schools are all 
divorced from their larger social context and social-
structural influences. These are the policy implications 
arising out of a criminology that assumes a human nature 
driven by "universal desires" or constitutional factors; a 
criminology that sees social-structural changes as 
unnecessary, undesirable, and in some cases impossible; a 
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perspective on crime that reifies the existing social order 
and suffers from an alienated and dissociated view of crime 
and society. This understanding of crime and the policies it 
engenders are inadequate for addressing crime in our society. 
The social-structural and reflexive criminology offered in the 
next chapter can overcome these limitations and suggest 
policies that can better address crime. 
Conclusions 
The Poverty of Criminology 
The interdisciplinary theories of crime critiqued in this 
dissertation claim to be theories of all crime and they claim 
to be significant improvements over other theories of crime. 
These theories also claim to be interdisciplinary, or in 
Gottfredson and Hirschi's (1990) case, they claim to not be 
disciplinary, hence they all claim to be superior to 
disciplinary theories of crime. They make these claims 
because they include, for example, psychological variables 
such as personality and temperament, and sociological factors 
such as families and schools in their analyses. However, as 
has been argued, these theories focus on the individual, 
possess an image of a self-interested "universal desire"-
seeking human nature, and examine families and schools 
divorced from their larger social contexts, while largely 
ignoring the influences of social-structural factors on what 
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is considered "human nature," in crime causation, and on 
cross-national differences in rates of crime. It has also 
been argued that these theories, all variants of control 
theories, are among the dominant perspectives in criminology 
today. 
This is the poverty of criminology today. These 
perspectives lack an adequately sociological and social-
structural perspective on crime. The field is dominated by 
theoretical perspectives that do not adequately address the 
complexity of crime and therefore are incapable of addressing 
the magnitude of the problem of crime in the United States. An 
analysis of the role of the social-structure is missing in 
these theories. The claim to "interdisciplinarity" carries 
with it the legitimizing assumption that the theory offers the 
reader a more complete theory of crime because it draws on the 
significant insights from various disciplines, but that is not 
the case with the interdisciplinary theories of crime 
critiqued here. While technically being interdisciplinary 
because of the inclusion of psychological and sociological 
variables, these theories still offer a very limited view of 
crime and criminality based on a set of assumptions giving 
primacy to the individual, their "nature," and the acceptance 
of and preference for the status quo. In addition, these 
theories are not adequately interdisciplinary because they 
ignore much of the evidence produced by sociological and 
72 
social-structural theories of crime. Their focus is on the 
individual or upon institutions divorced from the influences 
of other institutions or aspects of the larger social context, 
setting, or structure. For example, when these theories 
examine the importance of the family or school in producing 
crime, they analyze these institutions without considering the 
impact of social-structural factors such as the economy, the 
labor market, or patterns of class or racial discrimination on 
these institutions and on crime. These perspectives are not 
improvements over strictly disciplinary perspectives. 
Despite the serious limitations of the interdisciplinary 
approaches to crime discussed in this dissertation, their 
explanation and understanding of crime dominates, and their 
policies are those favored in our society. Generally, these 
perspectives are favored over social-structural approaches to 
explaining, understanding, and addressing crime because they 
embrace the status quo. According to Scheingold, social-
structural approaches to understanding and dealing with crime 
are generally opposed in our society and culture by the 
public, our political leaders, and our criminal justice system 
because: (1) it is easier to design programs that focus on the 
individuals engaged in crime than it is to remedy the social-
structural problems that contribute to the crime problem; (2) 
the status quo is left unchallenged and unchanged insuring 
that vested interests remain unthreatened while diverting 
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attention away from social-structural problems; (3) structural 
changes would be more costly monetarily, psychologically, and 
politically, especially for those in positions of power; and 
(4) the criminal justice system is designed to process, 
punish, and treat individuals, not to address or remedy 
social-structural problems (1991:1-28). Additionally, 
"structural interpretations of crime sorely tax the economic, 
political, and ideological resources of the state" 
(Scheingold, 1991:23), and "...structural measures entail 
redistributive and unpredictable policies, which divide the 
polity, because they require substantial commitments of 
resources and threaten vested interests" (Scheingold, 
1991:27). In contrast, the individualistic non-structural 
approaches to crime that are the focus of the critique in this 
dissertation discount social-structural causes and "solutions" 
to crime thereby leaving the status quo unchallenged. This 
explains, in part, the dominance and prominence of inter­
disciplinary perspectives on crime with an individual 
orientation and control theory assumptions. This orientation 
serves the interests of those in power and those who have 
anything to lose through a change in the social order. The 
social context influences the dominance of theoretical 
perspectives in additional ways also. 
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Social Context and Theory Dominance 
As has already been noted, control theories are among the 
most influential and dominant theories in criminology today. 
And it has been argued that all of the interdisciplinary 
theories examined in this dissertation are variants of a 
control theory perspective and embrace control theory 
assumptions. According to Williams, the reasons for the 
prominence of control theory, as well as the reasons for 
the prominence of any criminological perspective, has less to 
do with "new evidence" in support of any particular per­
spective than with the political climate of the times and 
"...the application of new value sets" (1981:24-25). Williams 
states further that: 
As society has become more conservative dur­
ing the past decade, conflict approaches have 
declined or become coopted into conservative 
thought and the prime contender of the con­
sensus theories has gotten 'old.' In a pe­
riod where society is concerned about the 
state of the family, religion is staging a 
rebirth, and national identity is in a state 
of crisis, any theory which reifies the value 
of conventional institutions and beliefs 
should gain popularity (1981:24). 
As has been argued in this dissertation, control theories 
reify the existing social order and embrace its standards and 
values. According to Williams, this helps to explain the 
dominance and popularity of this perspective. According to 
Jensen, Williams' "...view is consistent with the shifts 
toward deterrence, victimology, and incapacitation research as 
75 
well as the shift away from structural and cultural theories 
of delinquency toward social learning and social control 
theories" found in criminology today (1981:16-17). This shift 
in the causal research requires neither "...social class nor 
any other background characteristic to affect crime and 
delinquency.... Rather, the focus is on the strength of bonds 
between people and conventional others, institutions and 
values, or on generic learning processes" (Jensen, 1981:10). A 
similar argument is advanced by Scheingold in his statement 
that a society's understanding and approach to crime "...is at 
least as much a reflection of its political culture and its 
institutional capabilities as of the current state of 
criminological knowledge" (1991:5). Therefore, the dominance 
and popularity of particular perspectives is really more of a 
political matter rather than one of the quality of knowledge, 
evidence, or the nature of the insights on crime (Scheingold, 
1991; Lilly et al., 1989; Williams, 1981). And Scheingold 
notes that "volitional" or individual explanations and 
understandings of crime have been and continue to be dominant 
in our society, and continue to be preferred over "structural" 
explanations by our political culture and the criminal justice 
system. 
Since our explanations and understandings of crime 
suggest plans to address crime, one would expect a system that 
prefers individual explanations of crime to also propose 
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individual "solutions" to crime. This preference can be seen 
in the United States in recent calls for the renewal and 
expanded use of the death penalty, proposals for "boot camps" 
to deal with juvenile offenders, and the continued and 
increased reliance on punishment and incapacitation as the 
"solutions" to our crime problem. Very rarely do we hear 
plans to modify criminogenic factors in our social environment 
or proposals that suggest anything other than that crime is an 
individual problem. When is the last time a bill has been 
proposed in Washington that recommended full employment, the 
elimination of racial inequality, or a reduction in economic 
deprivation to combat crime? As will be seen in the next 
chapter, these are some of the factors identified as being 
criminogenic by a social-structural criminology. The policies 
advocated and followed by our political and criminal justice 
leaders instead reflect the dominance of individual and non­
structural understandings of crime. The theories examined in 
this dissertation, including those by Gottfredson and Hirschi 
(1990), Farrington and colleagues (1986), Wilson (1983), and 
Wilson and Herrnstein (1985), illustrate these same individual 
preferences and the dominance and shift in focus to non­
structural theories of crime in our society and in crim­
inology. This shift in focus successfully directs attention 
away from the social-structure to a focus on individual, 
family, and school failings. 
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STumary 
The interdisciplinary theories of crime critiqued in 
this dissertation focus on the individual and an image of 
human nature that ignores the social nature of both. These 
perspectives fail to recognize that "we are, at once, creative 
and created ritual agents—self-structuring subjects and 
structurally subjected selves" (Pfohl, 1994:505). When an 
aspect of the social-structure is examined, that aspect is 
examined divorced from the larger social context. In terms 
of plans to address crime, the focus is upon the individual 
and their immediate surroundings of the family or school, 
again divorced from the larger social-structure. The ideology 
expressed and unexpressed in these theories functions to 
maintain the status quo. Increased control of individuals is 
recommended while social change is seen as undesirable. 
Despite the attempts to legitimize those theories through an 
"interdisciplinary" designation, these theories do not include 
in their analysis insights on crime from a sociological and 
structural criminology. And yet we will only be able to 
understand, explain, reduce, and prevent crime by embracing a 
criminology that not only includes, but also emphasizes 
social-structural factors in its analysis of crime and 
criminality—a perspective that does not view the current 
78 
manifestation of human nature or society as eternal. In 
the next chapter, the nature and benefits of just such a 
nonreductionist, structural, and reflexive criminology will 
be discussed. 
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CHAPTER 4 
TOWARD A STRUCTURAL AND REFLEXIVE CRIMINOLOGY 
Introduction 
It has been argued thus far that if criminology is going 
to accomplish its goals of explaining and understanding crime 
and criminality, in addition to addressing the problem of 
crime in the United States, the focus of theories claiming to 
be examples of interdisciplinary criminology will have to be 
broadened to include social-structural factors. This means 
that criminology is going to have to become more sociological. 
The call for bringing sociology "back in" to criminology isn't 
about protecting professional "turf." An interdisciplinary 
approach to the study of crime should be followed if it serves 
to increase our ability to explain and understand this 
phenomena. However, criminology in recent years has been 
dominated by theories with an individual focus and level of 
analysis, with a view of a self-interested "universal desire"-
seeking human nature, by theories that reify and prefer the 
status quo, by theories that believe that crime is the result 
of inadequate "controls," and by theories that examine the 
individual, families, and schools divorced and dissociated 
from their social contexts and influences. The explanations 
and understandings developed, and the solutions and policies 
to address crime that emerge from such a criminology are 
inadequate for addressing the realities of crime. 
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The theories examined in this dissertation claim to be 
theories of all crime, and Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), 
Farrington and colleagues (1986), Wilson (1983), and Wilson 
and Herrnstein (1985), all claim their theories are im­
provements over other theories of crime. All the theories 
discussed claim to be improvements over existing theories 
because they draw upon insights provided by various disci­
plines. But in reality, these theories have minimized and/or 
ignored significant insights from the sociological literature 
on social-structural influences on crime. In this chapter, 
examples of research from a sociological and structural 
criminology will be discussed that can improve our expla­
nations and deepen our understanding of crime while helping to 
devise strategies and policies that can better address the 
problem of crime. 
While arguing that social-structural factors need to be 
brought back into our analysis of crime, this dissertation 
also argues for the recognition that we both create our social 
world and are created by and subject to the created social-
structure (Pfohl, 1994; Bergcr and Luckman, 1966; Marx, 1956). 
It will be demonstrated that social-structural factors play a 
significant role in creating crime, and we need to recognize 
that since we have created our social world, we can recreate 
it in order to prevent or reduce crime. The importance of 
human agency in crime and in its remedy must be acknowledged. 
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For these reasons, a structural and reflexive criminology is 
advocated to adequately explain, understand, and address 
crime. The interdisciplinary theories critiqued in this 
dissertation focus on the individual but not their role in 
recreating the social-structure. The theories examined and 
theories of like kind, suffer from an alienated view of men 
and women in society, reify the existing social order, and 
minimize or ignore social-structural influences on crime. A 
social-structural and reflexive criminology would benefit our 
explanation, understanding, and response to crime through a 
recognition of the reciprocal relationship between the 
individual and their society. 
A Social-Structural Criminology 
Like Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), Farrington and 
colleagues (1986), Wilson and Herrnstein (1985), and control 
theories in general, Wilson (1983) argues that the origins of 
crime are to be found in early socialization experiences, lack 
of self-control or restraints, and in ineffective child-
rearing practices in the family. Wilson argues further that 
these early experiences, in interaction with individual 
predispositions, are the causes of crime—"...experiences 
occurring long before the child can have much contact with the 
labor market..." (1986:223-224). This is an example of how 
Wilson dismisses the role of social-structural factors in 
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creating crime. As Currie remarks: 
What I cannot fathom, is why Wilson seems un­
able to comprehend that what goes on in the in­
timate settings of early childhood is profoundly 
influenced by forces outside those settings.... 
...I call this the "fallacy of autonomy"—the 
belief that what goes on inside the family can 
be separated from what goes on outside it. 
...Can Wilson really believe that what happens 
to parents in the labor market has nothing 
to do with how they bring up their children, 
or the quality of the resources they're able 
to bring to that task (1986:229). 
But Wilson does dismiss the social-structure in this fashion 
as do the other theorists discussed. This is why Gottfredson 
and Hirschi can conclude that "...the state is neither the 
cause of nor the solution to crime" (1990:272). Gottfredson 
and Hirschi state further that "there is no larger purpose 
behind rape, or robbery, or murder, or theft, or embezzlement, 
or insider trading" (1990:256). They instead suggest "...that 
the motive to crime is inherent in or limited to immediate 
gains provided by the act itself" (1990:256). Besides 
confusing the motive to commit a crime with its causation, 
Gottfredson and Hirschi also ignore social-structural factors 
that could help explain why "motives" to commit crimes appear 
more often in some places and times than in others, and why 
crime rates vary from region to region within a country and/or 
between countries. In the following paragraphs, research in 
structural criminology will be examined to demonstrate the 
importance of the role of the social-structure in crime 
causation, and to explore some of the "larger purposes" behind 
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crime that Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), Wilson (1983), 
Wilson and Herrnstein (1985), Farrington and colleagues 
(1986), and other theories sharing their perspective, 
assumptions, and focus, minimize and ignore. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, several of the 
dominant theories of crime today ignore or minimize social-
structural factors' influence on crime. They do this in spite 
of research indicating the importance of structural factors. 
For example, in a review of Gottfredson and Hirschi's A 
General Theory of Crime (1990), Polk states that: 
if these authors are to be believed, the prob­
lems of American Blacks can be reduced to 
issues concerned with child-rearing practices, 
and readers can pass over such questions as 
poverty, the recent and dramatic shifts in the 
shape of unemployment..., the quality and emer­
gent social isolation of city life, centuries 
of discrimination and prejudice, and institu­
tional racism. Of course, they have already 
argued that unemployment is not important, 
citing, as one might expect, Hirschi's own 
work on one group of high school adolescents, 
but conveniently ignoring a great wealth of 
data which argues that the individual experi­
ence of unemployment is strongly related to 
crime. This tendency to ignore inconvenient 
empirical evidence is a characteristic that 
is unfortunately not uncommon in the arguments 
advanced by these writers (1991:576). 
It is evident to Polk that structural factors are relevant to 
crime and he relates that the literature indicates as much. 
Furthermore, his review points to attempts by Gottfredson and 
Hirschi to shape the data on crime to fit their theory, 
including ignoring "... large batches of data inconvenient to 
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their hypotheses" (Polk, 1991:579). Whether or not these 
theorists purposefully distort the research, while an 
important point, is not the main issue here. Polk's 
observations stress the importance of social-structural 
factors in crime causation—factors which Gottfredson and 
Hirschi (1990) ignore in their theory of crime emanating from 
low self-control. It is worth noting that Farrington and 
colleagues (1986) also minimize or ignore these same social-
structural factors in crime causation in their theory of 
crime. As discussed earlier, these authors cite research 
indicating the importance of social-structural factors, such 
as poverty, in causing crime, but then choose to ignore those 
structural insights in their theory of crime. These authors 
opt instead to focus their attention on individuals and their 
coping mechanisms, families and their socialization skills, 
and schools and their abilities to induce obedience, as the 
sources of and solutions to crime while divorcing these 
mechanisms, skills, and abilities from their social context. 
As long as social-structural factors are left out of the anal­
ysis of crime, we are bound to emerge with an incomplete and 
disabled explanation and understanding of crime, and we will 
be unable to deal effectively with crime in the United States. 
Through an examination of examples of research showing the 
importance of social-structural factors in crime causation, an 
approach to resolving these inadequacies will be proposed. 
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Several studies demonstrating the importance of social-
structural factors in crime causation have already been 
discussed at various points in the previous chapter. The 
National Research Council (1993) report discussed states that 
too much attention has been paid to individuals and their 
families in the study of delinquency, while not enough 
attention has been paid to the importance of social-structural 
factors such as income and social opportunities in creating 
delinquency. The report concludes that criminal activity is 
much more likely for adolescents facing economic hardships. It 
has also been noted that the interdisciplinary theories of 
crime examined in this dissertation focus on the importance of 
good parenting skills in preventing delinquency and crime. 
These theories believe that inadequate socialization, coupled 
with a self-interested human nature and lack of self-control 
or restraint, leads to crime. But these theories have ignored 
the literature that stresses how social-structural factors 
such as income inequality, economic hardship or disadvantage, 
economic stress (e.g., Conger et al., 1994; NRC, 1993; Conger 
et al., 1992; Currie, 1985a; Simons et al., 1992), unem­
ployment, and poverty (e.g., NRC, 1993; Jones, 1988; Currie, 
1985a; Wilson, 1980) negatively influence parenting skills. 
These and other social-structural factors must be included in 
the study of crime if we are to explain and understand why, 
when, and where crime occurs. The wide variations of crime 
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rates and criminal behavior within and between nations that 
exists cannot be understood by studying individuals, families, 
and schools divorced from these factors and influences. 
In his review of the literature on structural causes of 
crime, Hagan notes that "there is considerable recent evidence 
of direct effects to the degree, and absolute concentration, 
of neighborhood poverty on violent crime" (1994:88). Hagan 
also discusses evidence for the relationship between unem­
ployment, "general and/or racial socioeconomic inequality," 
and relative deprivation and crime. In a review of over sixty 
studies on the relationship between unemployment and crime, 
Chiricos argues "...that evidence favors the existence of a 
positive, frequently significant U-C [unemployment-crime] 
relationship" (1987:203). Furthermore, Chiricos argues that: 
...efforts to increase the availability and 
value of work can be expected to have some 
depressing effect on the value of property 
crime as an alternative. And, while the re­
lationship between unemployment and crime 
rates is far from perfect, it is sufficient 
to put jobs back on the agenda for dealing 
with crime (Chiricos, 1987:203). 
In other research demonstrating social-structural effects 
on crime, Sampson, in a study of the effect of male jobless­
ness and family disruption on urban black violence, concluded 
that "...male joblessness...has the strongest overall effect 
on family disruption, which in turn is the strongest predictor 
of black violence" (1987:377). Sampson's research has 
important ramifications for the interdisciplinary theories 
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discussed in this dissertation. These theories blame crime on 
individuals lacking self-control or restraint and families for 
failing to parent, socialize, or control their children 
adequately. Sampson's study stresses the importance of 
social-structural factors in impacting both families and 
individuals via employment opportunities. Support for this 
notion can be found in Colvin and Pauly's literature review on 
the influence of parent-child bonding on juvenile delinquency. 
Colvin and Pauly conclude from their review that a number of 
"...studies suggest that the coerciveness of family control 
structures, conditioned by parents' work experiences, 
contributes at least indirectly to the production of 
delinquency" (1983:537). While the interdisciplinary theories 
examined minimize or ignore the importance of social-
structural factors such as employment opportunities or 
economic deprivation in crime causation, even in impacting 
families, a number of recent studies have stressed the 
importance of these factors in influencing families and 
parenting (e.g.. Conger et al., 1994; NRC, 1993; Conger et 
al., 1992; Jones, 1988; Sampson, 1987) and criminal outcomes 
(e.g., NRC, 1993; Sampson, 1985 & 1987; Wilson, 1980). Sampson 
concludes "... that the extremely high level of black violence 
in American cities cannot be separated from the equally 
pressing problems of black male joblessness and family 
disruption" (1987:378). To address these problems, Sampson 
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recomniends "...that social policies be directed toward the 
structural forces of economic deprivation and labor-market 
marginality faced by black males and the resulting conse­
quences for family disruption and community crime" (1987:387). 
These findings corroborate the claim that we cannot adequately 
explain, understand, or address crime without taking the 
social-structure into account. 
Other research with important implications for theories 
of crime focusing on the family can be found in a review of 
the literature on the effect of unemployment on children, 
adolescents, and families, by Jones (1988). According to 
Jones, "family socioeconomic status is not only the best 
single predictor of children's health status and development, 
but also predicts school failure and behavioral disturbances" 
(1988:204-205). Jones also notes that reduced resources 
resulting form unemployment weakens parental effectiveness and 
"...may damage the satisfaction derived from family rela­
tionships..." (1988:203). Since the interdisciplinary 
theories of crime examined in this dissertation place much of 
the responsibility for crime on families, it would seem that 
Jones' study of unemployment and its effects on the family 
would be an important part of their analysis—but this is not 
the case. Instead of just "fixing" parents and their social­
ization skills, or controlling children more effectively as 
the theories critiqued in this dissertation recommend, Jones 
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states that "probably one of the most effective programs to 
assure children would grow to maturity in a positive envi­
ronment is a full employment economy" (1988:211). Further­
more, Jones adds that family problems, child behavioral 
problems, and substance abuse "...may be the outcome of 
unemployment, and not the result of family dynamics" 
(1988:212). Jones' review clearly suggests that social-
structural factors need to be examined to understand family 
dynamics, parenting, and child behavioral problems that could 
possibly lead to delinquency and crime. 
Additional evidence for the unemployment-crime rela­
tionship can be found in research by Allan and Steffensmeier 
(1989) on the underemployment of youth and property crime. 
According to those researchers, unemployment is associated 
with high arrest rates for juveniles while "low quality of 
employment (e.g., inadequate pay and hours) is associated with 
high arrest rates for young adults" (1989:107). The authors 
suggest that to rectify this situation "...the most viable 
policy is one that produces more jobs for teenagers while 
simultaneously providing better-paying jobs for young adults" 
(1989:120). Allan and Steffensmeier also note that social 
controls—factors considered so important in crime prevention 
in the interdisciplinary theories of crime critiqued in this 
dissertation—lose their effectiveness due to cynicism and 
alienation resulting from a lack of suitable employment 
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(1989:110). These results are supported in research by 
Farrington, Gallagher, Morley, St. Ledger, and West, finding 
that youths committed more crimes "...during periods of 
unemployment than during periods of employment" (1986:351). 
Furthermore, "...unemployment was related to crime 
independently of the many individual differences between 
convicted and unconvicted persons" (1986:351). Farrington, 
Gallagher, and colleagues suggest further that the link 
between unemployment and crime may be based on financial need 
due to their finding that unemployment was related to higher 
rates of crime for material gain but not for other types of 
crimes (1986:351). 
Additional evidence demonstrating the importance of 
including social-structural factors in the analysis of crime 
can be found in research by Sampson (1985) examining the role 
of structural economic factors on rates of offending across 
the United States. Sampson found structural economic factors 
to be "...important in predicting offending patterns" 
(1985:666). Specifically, "...income ineguality has a 
significant positive effect on black criminal offending..." 
while "...the level of white poverty had significant positive 
effects on white violence and burglary" (Sampson, 1985:666-
667). Overall, relative inequality was found to be more 
criminogenic than poverty for blacks. 
Inequality was also identified as a factor influencing 
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homicide rates in a recent review of the literature by Land, 
McCall, and Cohen (1990). These researchers found that 
cities, metropolitan areas, or states that were relatively 
more deprived had higher homicide rates than those that were 
relatively more affluent. Additionally, areas with high 
population density or a greater percentage of divorced males 
tended to have higher homicide rates than areas low in 
population density or low in percentage of divorced males. 
Higher homicide rates have also been found to be associated 
with such social-structural factors as poverty (Curry and 
Spergel, 1988), resource deprivation (Williams and Flewelling, 
1988), socioecomonic stratum (Centerwall, 1984; Lowry, Hassig, 
Gunn, and Mathison, 1988), violent cultural orientation 
(Williams and Flewelling, 1988), social disorganization (Curry 
and Spergel, 1988), and social disintegration (Williams and 
Flewelling, 1988). Additionally, Centerwall (1984) found a 
positive correlation between household crowding and rates of 
domestic homicide. Household crowding was viewed as an 
indicator of socioeconomic status as measured by the power to 
purchase uncrowded housing. And in research designed to test 
Blau and Blau's racial/ethnic inequality hypothesis, Balkwell 
(1990) found strong support for the claim that racial and/or 
ethnic inequality increases the rate of homicide. These 
examples of research on homicide clearly suggest that an 
examination of social-structural factors is necessary if we 
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are to explain, understand, and address criminal homicide in 
the United States. 
In research examining the effects of labor stratification 
on crime, Crutchfield found that labor instability and 
stratification had "...very strong effects on homicide and 
assault" rates (1989:506). Crutchfield examined two 
fundamental segments of the labor market in his analysis— 
primary and secondary occupations. Primary occupations were 
defined as those central to the functioning of the economy, 
whereas secondary occupations were defined as those "...on the 
periphery of the economy" (1989:492), such as service sector 
occupations or other jobs that are unstable and/or poorly 
paid. Crutchfield argues that secondary occupations provide 
"...little opportunity to establish important social bonds to 
careers or the work place," in addition to creating an 
unstable work environment and a "...setting in which violent 
crime will occur" (1989:494). This negative environment is 
exacerbated further by unemployment, underemployment, and 
frequent turnovers common among secondary occupations. 
Results indicated that high percentages of workers in 
secondary occupations, high unemployment rates, and high rates 
of poverty were all related to higher levels of criminal 
violence (1989:498-499). Crutchfield stressed that "the 
overall thrust: of his paper is "...that labor structure must 
be taken into account when considering the effects of economic 
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indicators on violent crime..." (1989:503). Furthermore, the 
"...paper argues that observed relationships between poverty, 
income inequality and violent crime are in large measure 
produced by the stratification of labor" (1989:507). While 
the theories critiqued in this dissertation ignore or minimize 
the significance of the social structure, Crutchfield's 
research, along with the other structural research reviewed, 
demonstrates clearly that social-structural factors in crime 
causation must be included if we are to explain, understand, 
and address crime adequately in the United States. As 
Crutchfield notes, "although structural determinants of crime 
are not currently popular with some social scientists and 
policy makers, these results indicate that investigation along 
these lines continues to be desirable" (1989:506). 
An important presentation and development of a social-
structural criminology which integrates such insights as those 
discussed above, can be found in John Hagan's Crime and 
Disrepute (1994). After reviewing the literature, Hagan 
argues that to adequately understand crime, such things as the 
recent and dramatic changes in the U.S. economy, racial and 
economic inequality, residential segregation, capital 
disinvestment, employment opportunities, and the concentration 
of poverty need to be explored. According to Hagan; 
A new sociology of crime and disrepute focuses 
attention on the criminal costs of social in­
equality Increased social inequality and 
reduced economic growth are both associated with 
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increases in crime, especially in America's low-
income minority communities. 
Structural changes have brought increasing 
inequality into the American economy and into 
the lives of individuals who live in its most 
distressed communities. Three interconnected 
processes of capital disinvestment—residential 
segregation, racial inequality, and the concen­
tration of poverty—have intensified the crime 
problems of these communities (1994:98). 
By "capital disinvestment," Hagan is referring to processes 
whereby capital resources are diverted "...away from socially 
and economically distressed communities" (1994:xii). For 
example, during the 1980's disinvestment occurred through the 
upward redistribution of resources such as income and wealth 
and the social opportunities connected to such resources. As 
a consequence of the economic policies and tax breaks imple­
mented by the Reagan administration, the Congressional Budget 
Office reports that the average net income for the poorest ten 
percent of Americans dropped by 10.5 percent between 1977 and 
1987, while the average net income of the top ten percent 
increased by 24.4 percent, and the wealthiest one percent of 
Americans experienced a 74.2 percent increase in income 
(phillips, 1990:14). According to Hagan's argument, this 
disinvestment in income, along with other forms of disin­
vestment, results in diminished opportunities and resources 
for lower income Americans and their communities and increases 
the chances of "recapitalization," or criminal adaptations, to 
achieve a semblance of upward mobility or success. These 
criminal activities represent an attempt to recapitalize on 
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available resources to achieve desired goals. Hagan's 
"...sociological view suggests that expanded social as well as 
economic opportunities can provide a foundation for broadened 
participation of citizens in the production of economic wealth 
and a reduction in the social costs of crime" (1994:99). 
Other researchers demonstrating the role that social-
structural factors play in generating crime include Currie 
(1985a), who has documented the strong relationship between 
inequality, poverty, unemployment, and crime; Bursik and 
Grasmick (1993) who found that economic deprivation had a 
strong direct effect on juvenile delinquency; Sampson (1986) 
who discovered that urbanization had a direct effect on 
intergroup conflict, while inequality exacerbated ingroup 
victimization; and Taylor and Covington (1988) who found that 
relative deprivation increased levels of violence in 
neighborhoods experiencing underclass solidification, while 
violence in gentrifying neighborhoods was connected to 
increased social disorganization. These studies, like the 
others discussed above, suggest that we cannot explain, 
understand, or solve our crime problem if we fail to take 
these and other social-structural factors into account in our 
theories of crime. In addition to being social-structural, a 
complete criminology needs to also be reflexive. 
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A Reflexive Criminology 
The call for a reflexive criminology has several meanings 
in this dissertation. First, this is a call for a criminology 
that is self-critical and self-aware (e.g., Bohm, 1981; 
Gouldner 1976 and 1970). A reflexive criminology is one that 
recognizes that the subject engaged in the investigation is 
always implicated in the object of study (Gouldner 1976), and 
that the theorist "...always plays an active role in the 
selective framing of meaningful knowledge: (Pfohl, 1994:8). 
This means that the interests and experiences of the subject 
always find their way into the explanation and understanding 
that emerges from a theory of crime. A complete separation of 
subject and object, therefore, is not possible. In agreement 
with Bohm, this dissertation argues that "...any criminology 
or any social science that professes to be 'critical' must be 
'reflexive' about its own interests and value commitments as 
well as cognizant of its grounding in ideology" (1981:35). 
A second characteristic of a reflexive criminology is 
that it considers the ethical implications of its work (Bohm, 
1981). As Lilly and colleagues note (1989), different 
theories of crime suggest different strategies for addressing 
crime. The implications for prevention or remediation 
emerging from a theory of crime need to be recognized and 
considered critically. 
A third sense of the term reflexivity in this disser­
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tation refers to the recognition that while individuals are 
subject to an existing social-structure, they at the same time 
create and recreate the existing social structure through 
their thoughts and actions. Reflexivity in this sense 
recognizes that while people are social products and society 
is an objective reality, society is also a human creation 
capable of being modified or changed (e.g., Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966). Borrowing from phenomenology and ethno-
methodology, a reflexive criminology would recognize that 
everyone is "...engaged in the process of creating social 
reality through..." their "...thoughts and actions" (Ritzer, 
1983:353). A reflexive criminology would not suffer from an 
alienated or dissociated view of men and women in society—a 
view that separates subject and object and fails to recognize 
that the current manifestation of human nature or of society 
is not eternal. A reflexive criminology would recognize that 
the individual and society cannot be separated without the 
distortion of both (e.g., Ellul, 1990; Oilman, 1976). 
Additionally, a reflexive criminology would understand that 
the particularistic conception of human nature and of society 
is capable of being modified or changed, and would recognize 
the reciprocal relationship between the individual and society 
(e.g.. Oilman, 1976; Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Marx, 1956). 
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Policy Implications from 
Social-Structural Criminology 
Whereas the interdisciplinary theories of crime examined 
in this dissertation see the solution to the crime problem in 
the United States in individuals, their families, and to a 
lesser extent, their schools, a social-structural criminology 
recognizes that crime cannot be adequately addressed without 
also taking into account social-structural factors in crime 
causation. The interdisciplinary theories discussed in the 
previous chapter suggested policies and programs that focus on 
strengthening families, parent-training, teaching self-
control, and on controlling "universal desires" or unruly 
natures through effective socialization and social control. 
As Scheingold (1991) points out, this focus certainly serves 
the interests of those who wish to maintain the status quo. By 
focusing on the individual and their lack of self-control or 
restraint, and on families or schools for failing to 
adequately control individuals, the focus is diverted away 
from any role the existing social-structural arrangements 
might have in crime causation. As has been argued previously, 
this focus helps to explain the popularity and dominance of 
interdisciplinary theories of crime with an individual 
orientation and control theory assumptions. Structural 
explanations and understandings of crime instead challenge the 
existing social arrangements thereby threatening vested 
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interests and the status quo (e.g., Scheingold, 1991). This 
orientation helps to explain the lack of popularity or 
dominance of social-structural explanations, understandings, 
and policies to address crime (e.g., Scheingold, 1991; Lilly 
et al, 1989). But given all of the "facts" regarding crime, 
both structural and individual, existing social arrangements 
must be considered in any successful explanation or under­
standing of crime and in any effective policy designed to 
address crime. 
As Scheingold notes, any fair reading of the research on 
crime indicates that crime "...is attributable to an inter­
dependent web of social forces and individual characteristics" 
(1991:4). The interdisciplinary theories of crime examined in 
this dissertation present a very lopsided view of crime devoid 
of any social-structural understanding of crime. Given a 
social-structural understanding informed by the factors 
identified in the research discussed in this chapter, policies 
to address crime emanating from a social-structural crimi­
nology would revolve around various proposals to restructure 
existing social arrangements. In general, policies suggested 
would involve reducing or eliminating unemployment, poverty, 
inequality, prejudice, and discrimination. 
Specifically, after noting the positive relationship 
between unemployment and crime, Chiricos recommends putting 
"...jobs back on the agenda..." to reduce crime (1987:203). 
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similarly, Sampson recommends policies aimed at "...the 
structural forces of economic deprivation and labor-market 
marginality..." in order to combat family disruption and crime 
(1987:378). Jones states that the most effective program to 
assure that children live in "...a positive environment is a 
full employment economy" (1988:211). Jones notes further that 
unemployment negatively effects parenting skills and abilities 
and may lead to child substance abuse and behavioral problems 
(1988:212). Additionally, Allan and Steffensmeier note that 
"...the most viable policy..." to combat crime for juveniles 
and young adults would be one "...that produces more jobs for 
teenagers..." and "...better-paying jobs for young adults" 
(1989:120). While the other social-structural studies of 
crime discussed earlier in this chapter (along with several 
other studies discussed in the previous chapter) do not 
specify policy recommendations, their results also suggest 
reducing or eliminating unemployment (Crutchfield, 1989; 
Farrington, Gallagher, et al., 1986; Wilson, 1980), reducing 
or eliminating income inequality, resource deprivation, and 
poverty (NRC, 1993; Land et al., 1990; Crutchfield, 1989; 
Curry and Spergel, 1988; Lowry et al., 1988; Williams and 
Flewelling, 1988; Sampson, 1985; Wilson, 1980), and/or 
reducing or eliminating racial or ethnic inequality (Balkwell, 
1990). 
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Clear policy recommendations for crime reduction or 
prevention are present in Hagan's recent book, Crime and 
Disrepute (1994). His recommendations include the expansion 
of social and economic opportunities, and reinvestment of 
social and cultural capital in our society, communities, and 
individuals. Additionally, there are recommendations for the 
reduction of all forms of social inequality and a redistri­
bution of resources in the United States. 
While policy implications from social-structural 
criminology are clear, the implementation of such plans are 
difficult and are likely to be met with resistance (e.g., 
Scheingold, 1991; Lilly et al., 1989; Currie, 1985a). 
Questions regarding how the reduction in inequality is to be 
accomplished and who will sacrifice what and how much are 
bound to be points of contention. It is much easier to blame 
individuals and families for crime, put parents into training 
programs to improve their skills, teach people to cope with 
their disadvantage, and punish transgressors, than it is to 
eliminate or significantly reduce inequality, poverty, or 
discrimination. But even with its greater difficulty in 
implementation, if the social-structural factors that help to 
explain why crime appears where it does, or even why low self-
control or poor parenting appear where they do, are ignored, 
our efforts to reduce or prevent crime will continue to fall 
short. 
102 
Conclusions 
The overview of literature presented in this chapter 
indicating important social-structural causes of crime is not 
intended to be an exhaustive review. Nor is the development 
of a social-structural criminology complete. But with 
explanations and understandings like those discussed above 
which incorporate social-structural insights, criminology can 
more adequately perform its task of explaining, understanding 
and addressing crime. These findings, along with those 
discussed throughout this dissertation, demonstrate that 
ignoring social-structural factors will lead to incomplete and 
inadequate explanations, understandings, and policies to 
address crime. Whatever particular perspective is employed, 
whether emerging from an anomie (e.g., Messner and Rosenfeld, 
1994) or a conflict tradition (e.g., Hagan, 1994) , for 
example, social-structural analysis is necessary to explain 
and understand why, where, and when crime appears. Addi­
tionally, research on the connection between social-structural 
factors and crime make it evident that policies to address 
crime are bound to fail if they only focus on individuals, 
their families, and their schools divorced from the larger 
social context and factors such as poverty, inequality, 
unemployment, and racial discrimination. 
Policy implications and recommendations emerging out of 
social-structural criminology aim directly at changing the 
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existing social arrangements in one fashion or another. 
Whether the recommendation or implication is for more and 
better employment opportunities (e.g., Allan and 
Steffensmeier, 1989; Jones, 1988; Chiricos, 1987; Sampson, 
1987), a reduction of inequality (e.g.. Land et al., 1990; 
Williams and Flewelling, 1988; Sampson, 1985), or an 
elimination of racial segregation (e.g., Hagan, 1994), a 
realignment of resources and a threat to established social 
arrangements and interests is involved. Unlike the inter­
disciplinary theories discussed in this dissertation, most 
structural theories of crime recognize and embrace the 
desirability and possibility of social change to address 
crime. But as Scheingold (1991) notes, there is a marked 
preference in our society and culture for individual 
explanations and understandings of crime that reject the need 
for social-structural change. As long as the focus is on 
individuals, attention is diverted away from structural 
problems, and individual solutions to crime are proposed 
aiming at increasing self-control, tightening social controls, 
and the increased use of punishment. Evidence of this focus 
can be seen in the United States today in the continued and 
increased reliance over the last two decades on incapacitation 
and punishment as the solution to our crime problem (Hagan 
1994; Kemper, 1993; Currie, 1985a&b). The preference for 
individual explanations and understandings of crime further 
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ensures that individuals will be blamed and punished while 
vested interests are protected and structural changes rendered 
unnecessary (e.g., Scheingold, 1991). 
As has been stated at several junctures in this 
dissertation, the interdisciplinary theories of crime examined 
claim to be improvements over other theories of crime because 
they are theories of all crime and because they are inter­
disciplinary—meaning that they draw on insights and research 
from various disciplines in forming their explanations and 
understandings of crime. In reality, these theories leave out 
of their explanations and understandings the social-structural 
insights found in a sociological view of crime, insights that 
are necessary in order to explain, understand, and address the 
complex phenomena of crime adequately. While these theories 
are technically interdisciplinary because they draw on 
selected insights from several different disciplines, they are 
not adequately interdisciplinary because they leave social-
structural factors out of their analysis—the only factors 
that can explain the wide variations in crime within and 
between nations, and over time. A theory that blames all 
crime on low self-control, for example, and then blames 
parents for failing to socialize and teach their children 
self-control, cannot adequately explain why there are more 
people with low self-control in the United States (given our 
relatively very high crime rate) than in Canada, Europe, or 
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Japan. A social-structural criminology is better able to 
explain, understand, and address the complexity of crime and 
its social origins and context. For these reasons, a social-
structural and reflexive criminology is advocated in this 
dissertation. As Marx queried nearly 150 years ago: 
... if crimes observed on a great scale thus 
show, in their amount and their classification, 
the regularity of physical phenomena...is there 
not a necessity for deeply reflecting upon an 
alteration of the system that breeds these 
crimes...(Marx, 1956:229-230)? 
A criminology which includes social-structural factors in its 
analysis can avoid the reductionism found in the interdis­
ciplinary theories of crime examined in this dissertation— 
theories which reduce the complex phenomena of crime to 
individual explanations based on low self-control, genetic 
predispositions, and/or inadequate socialization. The fact 
is, without social-structural factors included in the analysis 
of crime, explanations of crime based on such factors as low 
self-control are really not explanations at all. Currie, in 
speaking of explanations of crime based on "antisocial 
personalities," remarked that this notion "...may give us a 
name for what is wrong with particular individuals who hurt 
others. But it cannot legitimately substitute for an 
explanation of why these individuals appear where they do" 
(1985a:217-218). Currie's remark also applies to explanations 
of crime based on low self-control, genetic predispositions, 
and/or inadequate socialization. None of these "explanations" 
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can tell us why, for example, the homicide rate in the United 
States is five times greater than Finland's, the next closest 
rate in the world among "developed" nations (Messner and 
Rosenfeld, 1994:22). These explanations cannot tell us why 
individuals with low self-control, genetic predispositions, 
and/or inadequate socialization, appear in the United States 
more often than in Finland or in the other "developed" or 
"industrial" nations. To understand the rates, patterns, and 
differences in occurrence of crime within the United States 
and throughout the world, a non-reductionist social-structural 
criminology is needed to examine the factors that shape these 
differences. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Poverty of Criminology Today 
As was noted in the opening of this dissertation, crim­
inology today is an interdisciplinary field of study. It has 
been argued that several dominant theoretical perspectives in 
criminology today, theories that claim to be interdisciplinary 
in some fashion, theories that claim to be theories of all 
crime, actually limit our ability to explain, understand, and 
address crime in the United States. The primary reason for 
the poverty of these theories of crime, as well as for the 
poverty of criminology today, is that these approaches have 
lost or ignored social-structural factors in their analysis of 
crime. Indeed, these theories have become less sociological 
in their analysis. While these theories can be called inter­
disciplinary in one sense because they draw upon some insights 
from such fields as psychology, economics, sociology, and 
biology, they are not adequately interdisciplinary. These 
perspectives, represented in this dissertation by Gottfredson 
and Hirschi (1990), Farrington and colleagues (1986), Wilson 
(1983), and Wilson and Herrnstein (1985), have largely 
minimized and/or ignored social-structural factors in their 
analysis of crime—factors that are critical to the expla­
nation, understanding, and to the ability to reduce or prevent 
crime. Because of this deficit, these theories fail to com­
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prehend the complexity of crime and criminal behavior. In 
agreement with Hagan and Palloni, this dissertation argues 
that criminology needs to become more sociological because 
"...the structural foundations of sociology make its ex­
planatory role necessary to the understanding of crime and 
delinquency" (1986:442). In addition, along with Messner and 
Rosenfeld, this dissertation argues that "...the formulation 
of a satisfactory explanation of cross-national variation in 
crime will require the systematic application of sociological 
knowledge and principles..." (1994:iii). 
Additionally, it has been argued in this dissertation 
that the claim of "interdisciplinarity" carries with it the 
legitimizing assumption that the theory offers a more complete 
explanation and understanding of crime because it draws from 
the various disciplines engaged in criminological inves­
tigation. However, the interdisciplinary theories critiqued 
in this study are missing an analysis of the role of the 
social-structure in crime causation and are therefore not 
adequately interdisciplinary. These theories which focus on 
individuals, families, and schools divorced from the larger 
social-structure, are not improvements over strictly disci­
plinary perspectives. 
The preceding argument does not amount to a call for a 
disciplinary or exclusively sociological criminology. The 
impact of crime on individuals, families, communities, and on 
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society is too great to get bogged down arguing over profes­
sional "turf." Whichever insights from whatever fields that 
can help us explain, understand, and deal with crime are 
worthy of our attention. However, a criminology devoid of 
sociological and structural insights is bound to develop an 
incomplete and inadequate explanation and understanding of 
crime. A sociological and structural perspective on crime is 
necessary to explain and understand this phenomena. It is the 
only perspective that can explain the wide variations in crime 
over time, and within and between nations. 
Given the limitations of a non-structural interdisci­
plinary criminology discussed in this dissertation, why then 
do these theories dominate today? The answer given in this 
study has been that there is an individual, cultural, and 
political preference for perspectives that focus on indi­
viduals, their families, and their schools as the "causes" of 
crime (e.g., Scheingold, 1991; Currie, 1985a). As long as 
individuals lacking self-control or restraint are blamed, or 
parents are blamed for poor parenting skills and inadequate 
socialization, or individuals are blamed for their inability 
to cope with their disadvantage, or schools are blamed for the 
failure to teach obedience to children, the focus is taken off 
of any social-structural factors that could better account for 
crime. The interdisciplinary theories critiqued in this 
dissertation express a strong preference and bias for the 
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status quo—identifying deviants out of adjustment as the 
cause of crime while the role of existing social arrangements 
in the generation of crime is left unexamined and unques­
tioned. This focus serves the interests of those who benefit 
from existing social arrangements—those who would presumably 
have the most to lose through changing those arrangements. 
These facts help to explain the popularity of non-structural 
interdisciplinary criminology (e.g., Scheingold, 1991; Lilly 
et al., 1989; Currie, 1985a; Williams, 1981). 
The bias in favor of the status quo in terms of social 
arrangements and relationships also strongly influences the 
policy recommendations and programs emanating from the 
interdisciplinary theories of crime critiqued in this 
dissertation. The policy implications derived from these 
theories focus on changing individuals, their families, and 
schools. Solutions proposed include programs and policies 
designed to enhance the abilities of families to socialize 
children, parenting-skills training and education programs, 
increasing punishment for undesirable behavior, intensi­
fication of social control measures in families and in 
schools, and teaching individuals self-control both in the 
family and in the schools. Given their view of a "universal 
desire"-seeking human nature, control of an otherwise unruly 
nature is all that is seen as possible in these interdis­
ciplinary theories of crime with control theory assumptions. 
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Social-structural factors that impact our "nature," 
socialization, families, parenting, and the schools are not 
addressed in their explanations or their policy recommen­
dations. A social-structural approach would help to 
"...refocus attention from individual criminals to the 
criminogenic features of the prevailing social order— 
ordinarily identified with extreme inequality" (Scheingold, 
1991:6). By bringing sociology with its social-structural 
insights back into criminology, an individual bias can be 
avoided and policies could be developed to address the complex 
factors that lead to crime. An adequately interdisciplinary 
criminology would include social-structural factors in its 
analysis and would entertain policies designed to address 
those factors identified as increasing the risks of crime. 
An interesting illustration of the flaws in the thinking 
of theorists who ignore social-structural factors in crime 
causation can be found in a review of Elliot Currie's 
Confronting Crime; An American Challenge (1985), by Travis 
Hirschi. Hirschi (1987) attacks Currie for his suggestion 
that inequality plays a role in causing such crimes as 
homicide. In response to Currie's discussion of the high 
rates of homicide in the United States relative to other 
"industrial nations," Hirschi states that: 
...the crime itself is not considered. Con­
spicuously missing is a discussion of the 
motives for murder, which many accounts de­
scribe as trivial, the crime often apparently 
112 
stemming from petty disputes over nothing at 
all. If these accounts are accurate—and there 
is no good reason to dispute them—it is easy 
to see why Currie might avoid them. Unless 
serious crimes have serious causes, it is not 
clear that they justify serious modification 
of existing social arangements (1987:68). 
Hirschi's analysis confuses the motive to commit a crime with 
the cause of a crime. The fact that the motive for most 
homicides is "trivial," resulting from an argument over a 
parking space or some other "petty dispute," if this is indeed 
true, does not mean that there are not larger social-
structural factors that can better explain the higher rate of 
homicide in the United States. Left unexamined are questions 
like why do "petty disputes" in this country end up in 
homicides more often than in other countries? Or, if it is a 
matter of having more "petty disputes" in the United States 
than in other countries, why are there more "petty disputes" 
here than elsewhere? Also left unexamined is the role of the 
wide availability of handguns in the United States and the 
role that might play in the likelihood of our "petty disputes" 
becoming homicides. Perhaps economic and racial inequality 
play a role in increasing the likelihood of "petty disputes," 
and in the likelihood of these disputes ending in homicide. 
Additionally, Hirschi fails to address the fact that our 
homicide rate is much higher than all other comparable 
nations. None of these issues are addressed or explored 
through a focus on motive. While motive and cause may 
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sometimes be equivalent, such as the case where an individual 
steals food from a grocery store because they are hungry, the 
manifest reason for the commission of this criminal act still 
does not give us a complete explanation or understanding of 
why more people steal food in one country than in another. To 
understand this fact we would have to examine such things as 
why there are more hungry people in one country than another 
and why they cannot or will not meet their needs in a 
legitimate fashion. Hirschi's continual focus on the 
individual or individuals to the exclusion of the social-
structure results in an incomplete and inadequate explanation 
and understanding of the complexity of criminal behavior. 
In conclusion, when social-structural factors are ignored 
in the analysis of crime, misunderstandings result. For 
example, Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990; Hirschi and 
Gottfredson, 1983) treat as invariant the relationship whereby 
involvement in crime peaks in mid to late adolescence and then 
sharply declines throughout adulthood. However, as Hagan 
(1994) notes, while this pattern is common in industrial 
societies in this century, a different pattern existed in the 
nineteenth century. The significance of this insight is that 
rather than being an invariant pattern explained by individual 
differences, social conditions shape this crime pattern. 
Social-structural factors need to be included in the study of 
crime if we are to adequately explain, understand, and respond 
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to crime effectively. A social-structural and reflexive 
criminology can meet these challenges. 
The Solution 
The solution to the poverty of criminology today is to 
replace the inadequate interdisciplinary theories of crime 
that are dominant in the field with theories that are truly 
interdisciplinary, social-structural, and reflexive. The 
theories examined, while claiming to be interdisciplinary, are 
not adequately interdisciplinary because they exclude a 
social-structural analysis of crime. An adequately 
interdisciplinary criminology would draw upon insights and 
knowledge from all relevant disciplines including the 
sociological and social-structural analysis of crime. In 
addition, a reflexive criminology would be self-critical and 
self-aware of its interests and position in the analysis of 
and action taken to address crime. A reflexive criminology 
would also recognize the reciprocal relationship between the 
individual and society. It is critical to recognize that 
while people's lives, opportunities, experiences, and choices 
are shaped by their social environment, their society is 
ultimately a human social creation capable of manipulation, 
modification, and change. In this way, a reflexive and 
critical criminology overcomes the alienation and dissociation 
of theories of crime that reify current social relationships 
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and arrangements and view those arrangements as eternal. The 
interdisciplinary and structural criminology advocated here 
would also recognize that what is regarded as "human nature" 
is the result of a complex interaction between individuals and 
their social reality. A social-structural criminology is 
therefore empowering. With the knowledge of which factors 
influence crime and our "nature," policies designed to modify 
or change social-structural factors can be devised and 
implemented. The fact that social-structural changes are more 
difficult to accomplish than programs aimed at individuals or 
families should not prevent us from attempting to address 
those factors identified as being criminogenic. For example, 
the structural research examined in this dissertation has 
identified unemployment, inequality, and poverty as important 
factors in crime causation. Programs designed to accomplish 
full employment, reduce inequality, and reduce poverty are by 
no means simple to devise. In addition, attempts to 
restructure opportunity and reduce inequality are bound to 
meet resistance from various interest groups. These 
difficulties, however, should not dissuade us from attempting 
to address these and other criminogenic factors in our 
society. 
If we seriously hope to reduce the crime problem in the 
United States, we need to address the social-structural 
factors that generate crime in the first place, rather than 
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teaching people and families to cope with their disadvantage. 
We are not going to solve our comparatively huge crime problem 
in the United States through parenting programs alone, or by 
increased punishment and social control. But these have been 
the directions advocated by many criminologists, our policy 
makers, and our leaders in recent years. There has been a 
shift towards incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution to 
deal with crime in the United States (Hagan, 1994). At the 
same time, there has been very little emphasis on the 
prevention of crime. Instead, the policies to address crime 
advocated by our political officials in the United States 
include advocacy for the death penalty, "boot camps" for 
juvenile offenders, increased punishment, mandatory 
sentencing, and the increased use of incarceration. When 
programs are designed that supposedly aim at prevention of 
crime, they turn out to be programs advocating "target 
hardening," neighborhood watches, or other strategies aiming 
at the prevention of victimization—but not the prevention of 
crime. Regardless of how many people we lock up in our 
prisons and jails, and regardless of how successful we are in 
making ourselves unattractive targets, if we do not address 
the factors that lead to crime to begin with, these efforts 
are destined to fail. The United States currently has one of 
the highest incarceration rates in the world (e.g., Hagan, 
1994; Messner and Rosenfeld, 1994; Kemper, 1993; Currie, 
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1985a&b). Huge increases in our prison populations have 
occurred over the last two decades as a result of the 
increased use of incarceration to address crime. However, the 
increased use of incarceration has not been met with a 
corresponding decrease in our crime rates (e.g., Hagan, 1994; 
Kemper, 1993; Currie, 1985a&b). As ex-policeman James Fyfe 
has remarked, "the current strategy [of building more prisons 
to address crime] is like trying to deal with AIDS by building 
more hospices" (quoted in Kemper, 1993:73). It is time to 
seriously consider the prevention of crime. 
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NOTES 
1 Groves and Lynch (1990) discuss two traditions in the study 
of crime, one involving "explanation" and the other "under­
standing." Explanation focuses on "establishing causal 
regularities," while "the goal of understanding is to inter­
pret human actions so that they might be meaningfully under­
stood" (1990:349). In this dissertation, both explanation 
and understanding are viewed as necessary to completely 
understand and address crime, a viewpoint shared by Groves 
and Lynch. 
2 To a certain extent, what is considered "pleasurable" or 
"painful" is subject to social/cultural definitions. For 
example, if a culture teaches people to be self-sacrificing 
in favor of the common good, would self-interest still be 
pleasurable, or would it now be "painful" in the sense of 
causing guilt at one's self-centeredness? And if we can be 
"other-interested," then what happens to Gottfredson and 
Hirschi's conception of "human nature?" If humans can be 
other than what they presently are, then does it make any 
sense to speak of "human nature"? Why assume that there is 
any "human nature" that has to be controlled by socializa­
tion. An alternative view would be that what Gottfredson 
and Hirschi call "human nature" is in reality a particular­
istic historical conception of human nature, shaped by the 
social, political, and economic conditions in which we live. 
For example, their emphasis on self-interest and profit-
seeking as part of our "nature" reflects the assumptions of 
a capitalist social and economic system. One of the most 
basic insights of the sociological perspective is the recog­
nition that we are social beings. 
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